So, just how good is Tony LaRussa anyway?
As a Cardinal Manager, TLR has won 1133 regular season games (as of 9/16), six NL Division Series, two LCS, and one World Championship. His teams have made the playoffs in seven of his thirteen seasons and have only suffered through three losing campaigns. He was National League Manager of the Year in 2002 and he is certain to be elected to the Hall of Fame. In spite of his success he remains a polarizing figure among Cardinal fans in general and at VEB in particular. Some think he represents the pinnacle of success of the Cardinals franchise and others believe he has squandered a terrific run of talent. I suspect the truth lies somewhere in between.
Attempting to evaluate the impact any manager has on his team’s success, especially in any kind of detailed way, is a daunting undertaking. Trying to evaluate all the managerial decisions during over 2000 games would be a task worthy of a multi-volume work. I am not qualified to do that and I still have a day job, so I’ll see if I can arrive at any meaningful conclusions by using a couple of macro measurements. I will preface my remarks with my own bias that I think a manager’s contribution to the success or failure of a team is typically over emphasized. I am a strong believer that the manager’s primary contributions are in the areas of recognizing talent (i.e. playing the correct players) and nurturing a winning atmosphere.
I will attempt to see if any meaningful conclusions can be drawn from two main areas: Pythagorean win expectancy and the amount of on-field success in relation to the team payroll. I think most VEB readers are familiar with Bill James’ Pythagorean algorithm and I found a reasonable explanation and refinement here http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=342 courtesy of Clay Davenport and Keith Woolner at Baseball Prospectus. The algorithm essentially states that if you divide the square of a team’s runs scored into the sum of the squares of runs scored and runs allowed (RS*RS)/((RS*RS)+(RA*RA)) the solution will be a winning percentage projection accurate to within approximately four wins of the actual total. I decided to look at every instance of NL teams Pythagorean Wins deviating from their actual wins by more than four to see if the manager might possibly be due either the credit or the blame.
DISCLAIMER: I am not making any argument that any of the following data proves anything. I am merely trying to promote discussion on the topic of just exactly how we evaluate manager performance. So, please don’t abuse me too badly if you think this is all just a bunch of hooey. If you have other thoughts I would love to hear them, but please try to support whatever opinion you express so that we can all hopefully learn something.
Pythagorean Wins
Since TLR became Cardinals manager in 1996 there have been 356 “team seasons” of which 89, or exactly 25%, have experienced season win totals that differed by 5 or more wins from their projected total. The Cardinals have experienced three seasons outside the Pythagorean win projection during TLR’s tenure. The first was in 1997 when the team came up six games sort of its projection during its 73-89 season. From 1998-2003 the team was within expected parameters, but the 2004 team that went 105-57 was only projected to win 100 games. Unbelievable as it may seem to Cardinals’ fans, the 2007 team was actually TLR’s best managing job as measured by Pythagorean Wins. While we all found the 78-84 record disheartening, the projection for that team was a record of 71-91.
As a sanity check, I decided to evaluate all of the 89 seasons that were outside of Pythagorean projections to see if there were any trends that seemed meaningful. I looked for managers who consistently underperformed the projection as well as those who exceeded it on a regular basis. I know this is completely unscientific, but I still found the results interesting. For lack of a better term I will call the teams and managers whose actual records were five wins or more short of the Pythagorean projection as “underachievers” and those whose actual records exceeded the projection by five wins or more as “overachievers”.
When you look at the list of underachievers it is littered with managers most people would regard as below average managers. The single worst season in the 1996-2007 period belongs to Tony Muser and the 1999 Kansas City Royals who only managed to win 64 games despite a projection of 76 for a total of -12. The closest pursuer was current Cleveland Indians manager Eric Wedge with a -11 total in 2006. There was a four-way tie for third worst at -9 between Don Baylor of the 2002 Cubs, John Boles of the 2001 Marlins, Buddy Bell of the 2001 Rockies, and Larry Dierker who managed the feat twice for the Astros in 2000 and 1997. Other notables on the bottom end of the scale were John Gibbons, Jimy Williams, Grady Little, Davey Lopes, and Alan Trammell.
The overachievers list is headed by Joe Torre’s 2004 Yankee team whose 101-61 record exceeded projections by 12 games. Bob Melvin’s Diamondbacks managed to overachieve by 11 games in both 2005 and 2007. Other top overachievers were Dusty Baker, Bobby Valentine, Dave Miley, Mike Hargrove, Tony Muser, Ken Macha, and Ozzie Guillen.
As you can see, Tony Muser made the list for top underachiever and overachiever. He was one of several managers who managed single seasons on both ends of the spectrum, so I decided to look for models of consistency. There are five managers who have more than one season of underachievement with no offsetting seasons of achievement. They are Buddy Bell (-9,-5,-5), Clint Hurdle (-5,-5), Davey Lopes (-7,-5), Alan Trammell (-7, -6), and Eric Wedge (-11,-5). As a footnote, Wedge’s 2008 Indians club is currently at -4 so he may join Buddy Bell as the only three-time loser. Consistent overachievers include Joe Torre (12,5,5,5,5), Ozzie Guillen (8,5), and Ron Gardenhire (7,5).
During the years of this analysis there were only three managers who guided the same club for the duration: Tony LaRussa, Bobby Cox, and Joe Torre. I lived in Atlanta from 1990-1995 and had the opportunity to watch Bobby Cox in action for virtually every Braves game during that time. While the Braves were extremely successful, I was never particularly impressed with Cox’s managerial expertise. He never really seemed to be able to figure out matchups very well and was not particularly effective in managing his bullpen. His cumulative record from 1996-2007 exceeded Pythagorean projections by +4, with a high of +5 in both 2000 and 2003 and a low of -6 in 2006. TLR’s record is very similar as his cumulative total is +6. Neither Cox nor LaRussa’s performance is statistically significant. However, Joe Torre’s record of overperformance is truly significant.
Torre’s cumulate total over 12 seasons is an astounding +37. The statistical variance for this metric over this time is 13.85, so Torre has exceeded the variance by 167%. The second best team was the Chicago White Sox with 17, followed by the Reds with 16, the Padres with 15, and a tie between the Angels, Giants, and Nationals with 14. The worst teams were the Royals (-32), the Rockies (-27), the Cubs (-26), and the Tigers (-25).
Team Payroll
As far as salaries go, it seemed only fair to me that a manager can only achieve a limited amount of success given the hand he is dealt. I don’t think any managers of the Washington Nationals or the Pittsburgh Pirates are going to be getting Hall of Fame consideration any time soon. Joe Torre serves as a fine illustration of the effect of payroll on managerial success. From 1996-2007 Joe Torre’s Yankee teams made the playoffs every year, won 28 divisional playoff games, 27 league championship games and won four of the six World Series they participated in. When Torre accepted the manager’s job for the Cardinals in August of 1990, he inherited a team with the eighth highest payroll in MLB and fourth highest in the NL. Unfortunately for Joe, and for Cardinal fans, the BOB would be in the bottom half of MLB payroll the next five years, including 24th in a 28 team league in 1993. As we are all painfully aware, Joe Torre, Hall of Fame Manager, wouldn’t even sniff the playoffs during his Cardinal tenure.
Joe’s last season as Cardinals manager was the first for the Cardinals current ownership group and was also the first for as General Manager for Walt Jocketty. After 143 games and a 62-81 record Walt cut Joe loose and Mike Jorgensen finished out the season. The Cardinals weren’t the only team in MLB with a new ownership group at that time as the Oakland A’s had changed hands. The A’s owners wanted to run a leaner ship and emphasize player development. TLR had just completed his third straight losing season as the A’s manager and wanted a commitment from the new ownership group to spend more money on player acquisition and retention. TLR found the commitment he was looking for, but he found it from the Cardinals. After languishing in the bottom half of MLB in payroll under the post-Gussie brewery ownership, the Cardinals jumped into the top ten in 1996 and made their first playoff appearance since 1987.
Is it really that simple? Is spending money all you have to do to get in the playoffs? The answer is kinda, but not really. We have all seen franchises make dumb moves on overpriced free agents that cripple the franchise. The real answer is sort of the opposite. Spending money doesn’t guarantee a spot in the playoffs, but not spending it can come close to guaranteeing a spot in front of the TV come October.
Since TLR became manager in 1996, NL teams in the bottom half of the league in payroll have actually made the playoffs ten times for almost 21% of the available slots. 2007 was the only time in the last twelve years that two teams in the bottom half actually advanced to the LCS. Other than that, 21 of the 22 LDS matchups have been won by teams in the top half of the league in payroll. The only exception was the 2003 world champion Florida Marlins. In the remaining seven series the bottom half teams went a combined 2-21 against top half opponents. That adds up to 21 of 24 LCS participants from the top half and 10 of 12 League Champions from the top half. For those of you with statistical bents, the correlation between payroll and wins in the NL from 1996-2007 was .502. Most would consider that a strong correlation.
During the DeWitt/Jocketty/LaRussa era the Cardinals spent $827,002,528 on payroll and were outspent by the Dodgers ($969M), the Mets ($960M) and the Braves ($949M). In close pursuit were the Diamondbacks ($713M in two fewer years), the Cubs ($795M), and the Giants ($780M). All payroll figures are from the USA Today Salaries databases. According to 2008 figures that I believe are from the start of the season, each of the teams ahead of us will continue to outspend the Cardinals and the Cubs will outspend the BOB by nearly $19M. If the Dodgers hang on in the West then all four of this year’s playoff teams will come from the top half of the salary pool.
You can see from the numbers above that some teams spend more wisely than others. While the Braves are no longer the annual leader in NL payroll they were during the ‘90s, they have parlayed their almost a billion dollars into a pretty decent trophy case. They made 10 straight playoff appearances since TLR took over the Cardinals and have won more NLDS games during that time (22) than any other NL team. The sorry news for the Braves, and their fans, is they have only won five of those ten NLDS series, have only won thirteen NLCS games in five tries while going 1-4 in LCS matchups and only won two measly World Series games for their billion dollars.
Don’t feel sorry for the Braves. The Mets have outspent the Braves and have a grand total of three playoff appearances, a single league championship, and the ignominy of being abused by the Yankees in their only World Series appearance. And then there is the Dodgers. What a pathetic mess, as their billion dollars has so far purchased them a single win (one game, not a series) in the NLDS.
The Cardinals are certainly a shining example next to those drunken sailors. While spending well over $100,000,000 less than the top three, the Birds have managed to win six of seven NLDS opportunities. Even though I am personally bitterly disappointed at the 2-4 record in the LCS, the fact remains that the Cardinals have won more LCS games than any NL team and are tied for the most World Series appearances with the Braves and Marlins.
I guess this is all mildly interesting stuff, but I am not really sure what it says about TLR. It says he has won a lot of regular season games. TLR’s 897 wins from 1996-2007 is second in the NL to the Braves (941) and fifth overall in MLB behind the Yankees (985), the Red Sox (916) and, ironically, the A’s (901). For what its worth, the A’s did it while spending $340M less than the Cardinals. In the 1996 LCS we lost to a Braves team that outspent us by 24%. The 2000 Mets outspent us by over 26% and the 2002 Giants outspent us by a mere $3.7M. When we beat Houston in 2004 we had a nearly $8M salary edge, but when we lost to them in 2005 we had a salary advantage of over $15M. However, we made up for it in 2006 by beating a Mets team with a $9M advantage and actually winning the World Series!
While the Cardinals have experienced a very nice run of success since 1996 it is very difficult to parcel out the credit for that success. I would start with the ownership that has been willing to outspend other cities that are in vastly larger markets than St. Louis. I am amazed that we have outspent Philadelphia, Chicago, Houston, and San Francisco. Especially Houston and Philadelphia as they are both more than twice the size of St. Louis and don’t have another team in their market. Along the same vane you have to give some thanks to the ownership of the teams that have outspent us, particularly New York and Los Angeles, and have very little to show for it. All that being said, some credit must certainly be due Walt Jocketty and Tony LaRussa. While I don’t think either one of them is necessarily the best in baseball, they were an effective team that got quite a lot out of the ownership’s investment.
I think, just like in any sport, you have to give a lot of credit to the players. Management can obtain all the right guys, but if they can’t stay healthy and perform then the team can’t win. Just look at the last two years. For all the various contributions that have led to the success of the team, none has been better than the collection of opinions that led to the selection of Albert Pujols in the 13th round of the 1999 amateur draft. The Cardinals only averaged 83 wins and had one division championship in TLR’s reign before Albert made the team in 2001. Since then, they have averaged 92 wins, made the playoffs in six of eight seasons, made the LCS five times, and the World Series twice. Let’s get him some help for 2009!
7 recs |
21 comments
Comments
great work, this is a very interesting diary...
the problem with really long diaries like this is that there is so much to discuss that it’s almost impossible to do it ;) No matter what it’s going to come across as abuse, when that’s not the goal at all.
anyway, to discuss the first bit, I don’t really agree with use using real-pyth win differentials to determine a managers effectiveness. It seems to me that pyth wins don’t really do a good job of taking into account the full results of the managers decisions. For instance, if TLR played iz2 at first in place of pujols, the team would score fewer runs, causing the expected (pyth) win % to decrease, and the team would also almost certainly lose more games. Pyth(iz2) – Real(iz2) would be about the same as Pyth(pujols) – Real(pujols). It would be a terrible managerial decision- one of the worst-possible decisions a manager could make- and the results would not be captured by this method.
Likewise, a manager who completely ignores platoon split effects would lose 10-20 more games with the same 25 men, but their pyth record differentials would probably both look about the same. I’m guessing the difference would be in the noise unless the manager did really stupid things regularly that led to lots of close losses.
So if the results of the worst-possible decisions aren’t documented, how can the grey-area decisions (Flores or Villone or Kinney to pitch to howard?) be? In baseball, for a decision like that, even the “right” decision leads to failure ~25% of the time, and often the “wrong” decision leads to success. If there was a way to judge “right” and “wrong” decisions perfectly, we wouldn’t need managers; you could just have an intern with a computer call decisions in from the owner’s box (or his mom’s basement ;)
And for all the dogma attached to looking at pyth wins in the rear-view mirror, we still don’t really know why some teams under/over-perform. there are general rules, like “over-performing teams usually had a good bullpen”, but is that “good bullpen” TLR’s usage, or Springer’s arm? Or a bit of luck? Probably a combination of all. Ned Yost made some of the most baffling (and predicatly unsuccessful) bullpen decisions I’ve ever seen, yet the 2009 Brewers have a larger positive pyth differential than the 2008 cardinals. Does that mean Yost was better than TLR this year? No.
Anyway, I just don’t think there is any way to numerically determine a managers effectiveness. There’s just too much noise.
"All I am saying is give Freese a chance!" -- nmstar
by SleepyCA on Sep 20, 2008 7:24 PM EDT reply actions 0 recs
we do know why
because pythag is just a w% estimator that can’t capture run distribution. It’s a toy that shouldn’t be taken too seriously. I honestly wish people would stop talking about it (no offense to the OP intended).
MGL looked at how pitchers performed against their projections on certain teams (there was no real Duncan effect IIRC) and it would be interesting to see that with hitters and pitchers on TLR teams. That would at least tell you more than pythag.
Otherwise, you are left with looking at decisions game by game or something. Maybe looking at bullpen usage using LI for relievers.
As long as the manager doesn’t do anything stupid to cause the team to lose, and most people are fairly happy, I think he’s doing a good job and none really stand head and shoulders above the other managers in the league that do this as well (there might be 5 or 20 that you’d see little or no difference, I really have no idea).
TLR has annoyed me on both fronts lately however.
by haltz on Sep 21, 2008 12:53 AM EDT up reply actions 0 recs
Exactly
in 2007, who do you credit for the bullpen? It is the direct reason we were 7 games over our pythag. The bullpen went 60 some games without blowing a 7th inning lead.
Is it the manager for putting Percival, Franklin, Izzy out there every night or is it those guys for not blowing any leads? It’s a hard topic to figure out.
by Hardcore Legend on Sep 21, 2008 2:10 AM EDT up reply actions 0 recs
I agree with the collective assessment that pyth
wins don’t really mean a whole lot. Unfortunately, I didn’t come to that conclusion until I was about 80% of the way through the data, so I thought I might as well publish it and see what sort of discussion I could generate. I was going to try to correlate it to bullpen effectiveness, but I couldn’t find an easy source of data that had the right years.
I suspect Mariano Rivera et al had a lot to do with Torre’s overperformance.
I thought the salary stuff was actually more interesting, especially the part about Oakland winning more games than the Cardinals while spending $340M less. I fear that we are about to go into an abyss as ownership may not be willing to keep up with salary escalations. Since the end of the 2005 season the Cards’ payroll has gone up 8.14. Our chief competition is burying us in the same time frame as Chicago has gone up almost 36 and Milwaukee over 100%. Every other team in the division has experienced payroll percentage increases over twice as high as the Cardinals.
If the NL major market teams ever get their act together and get better bang for their buck the Cardinals could be a perennial playoff outsider.
Those Pilgrims ain't lookin' so proud now...
by giveml on Sep 21, 2008 4:14 PM EDT up reply actions 0 recs
It's a good post
I’ve given Pythagorean a lot of thought, after last year, and I reached the conclusion that it probably doesn’t mean that much. If you have guys at the bottom of rotation, and the bottom of your bullpen, that will pour gasoline on any fire then you, as a manager, are going to look pretty good if Pythag is the barometer. Really though, does it give any indication one way or the other as to your managing ability? I say it doesn’t. Having Wells, Maroth, and Reyes giving up touchdowns and then Jimenez, Cate, Falkenborg, etc cleaning up those game means you are going to lose a few by a touchdown or 2.
Not saying all that to say LaRussa isn’t a good manager. Just saying pythag is not a measurement I hold in any high regard. I don’t have anything substantive or quantifiable to show one way or another what LaRussa’s value is, so I appreciate most any discussion around it – particularly one with a lot of thought behind it.
He’s shown an ability to squeeze more juice out of the orange than most project at the start of the season, and done it many times. This year was another case of it, really, though this late season collapse has been pretty brutal. He doesn’t get a gold star for this one, or probably even a silver one. Maybe a blue one though.
by Merry CRasmus on Sep 22, 2008 2:20 AM EDT up reply actions 0 recs
All I can say to this is this...
…Teams that are good don’t have guys like Maroth, Wells, and Reyes getting substantial innings for them, and they don’t have to turn to garbage like Jimenez, Cate, Falkenbourg, or whatever else they went to last year. So while Pyth. doesn’t definitively show a team’s quality level, it is useful for determining if a team fall into the generic good, mediocre, or poor categories. Now, a team’s overall record can show that too, but I guess you could say that Pyth. shows another picture of it, or something like that.
"Your Holiness, I'm Joseph Medwick. I, too, used to be a Cardinal."-Joe Medwick, to Pope Pius XII.
by redbirdnation8206 on Sep 22, 2008 11:34 AM EDT up reply actions 0 recs
Intuitive, may be seen in the data?
I wonder if “filtering” out games where the team wins or loses by 5+ for example (not filtering out, but only counting the game as + or – 5 in the pythag estimate) would make it more accurate. May be kind of an indicator of when managers give up on the game, and start thinking about the next day…
by duncans_army on Sep 28, 2008 10:51 AM EDT up reply actions 0 recs
I think you find your answer in your quotes -- these 2 in particular:
I thought the salary stuff was actually more interesting, especially the part about Oakland winning more games than the Cardinals while spending $340M less. I fear that we are about to go into an abyss as ownership may not be willing to keep up with salary escalations.
The A’s owners wanted to run a leaner ship and emphasize player development. TLR had just completed his third straight losing season as the A’s manager and wanted a commitment from the new ownership group to spend more money on player acquisition and retention. TLR found the commitment he was looking for, but he found it from the Cardinals.
Summary: TLR/Dunc may be the right managing team, for the right club, at the right time.
That was certainly true for the Cardinals, who’ve had basically veteran laden teams throughout his tenure in St. Louis. If you’re looking at the first quote though, and you think we can’t keep up with the Joneses in terms of salaries, maybe this is a good time to make a departure from the TLR/Duncan mold.
Few remember that this almost happened last fall, when the Yankees ran Torre out of town (how ridiculous does that decision look when looking at the data and the fact that Joe is in the playoffs this year and the Yankees are watching at home?) and LaRussa did everything but send Hank Steinbrenner a case of 18 year old scotch to audition for that job. The Yanks went with Girardi, who is probably going to be better developing young talent into a ballclub as he did with the Marlins in 2006, figuring that they were going to start building from. Now it looks like they might be ramping up the spending again this offseason and trying to make a run at another title as The Great Overpaid One (Jeter) gets older. The Yanks may have been better off hiring LaRussa, given that they’re probably going to be signing some expensive veteran pitchers this offseason and will have a team of veteran star players, which is what LaRussa seems to want.
Had Tony gone to New York the Cards may have been able to get Girardi, which may actually have been better off for the team’s long term health since the organization now seems to want to build from within. LaRussa seems to be built on the old model of building around veteran players with the occasional superstar young guns (Pujols & Morris with the Cards, Big Mac & Canseco with the A’s). Unless you’re the Angels, Mets, Yankees, Cubs, or Dodgers, I don’t think you can run an organization that way anymore. The Oakland/Minnesota/Atlanta model is going to get more and more prevalent in the future, which is:
#Develop/Draft your own talent
#Sign as much of your good talent as you can
#Trade surplus farm system talent for veteran players you can sign to short, cheaper deals
"I just wish that the late Harry Caray were still around so I could hear him mispronounce 'Kosuke Fukudome' every fukun' night" -- Dennis Miller
by fourstick on Sep 30, 2008 5:06 PM EDT up reply actions 0 recs
I left something out
I think it’s going to be very tough for the Cardinals, with their current payroll restrictions, to be able to consistently win year in and year out using the Oakland/Minnesota model. Minnesota has been able to do it fairly well, and will have a few more revenue streams opening up to them with a new ballpark opening soon. As fans, I think we can expect to have runs of 3-4 years good, 2-3 years bad, type of situations — unless Luhnow and Company defy all expectations in building the farm system. Considering that the front office seems unwilling to make big $$$ expenditures to sign Latin American talent, I don’t see this happening.
"I just wish that the late Harry Caray were still around so I could hear him mispronounce 'Kosuke Fukudome' every fukun' night" -- Dennis Miller
by fourstick on Sep 30, 2008 5:10 PM EDT up reply actions 0 recs
The payroll restrictions?
I just don’t see it being that restrictive. Everything I see indicates we’ll be right around the top third in payroll. I don’t think we’ll be using the Oakland/Minnesota model, but rather more of a hybrid. Oakland/Minnesota flip their talent when they are close to losing cost controlled status almost every time.
I think we’ll make a push at retaining Pujols for starters. I think we’ll be involved in the free agent market, though not to the same extent as the big boys. We are more likely to go for second tier free agents and keep them to shorter contracts I believe. And I think we’ll make more of an effort to retain homegrown talent long term once they establish themselves.
So those are all differences that I see between the Cardinals and the Oakland philosophy. I do agree that we are likely to rely heavily on the farm though, and agree that is somewhat unchartered waters for TLR – despite his near 30 years of experience.
by Merry CRasmus on Sep 30, 2008 8:08 PM EDT up reply actions 0 recs
I think we will find out very soon
about the payroll. The rest of the division is gaining on the Cardinals and, of course, the Cubs have blown past us. If Houston decides to throw around some money, and does it somewhat effectively, they could stay in front of us. Cincinnati is not that far away. The Phillies will probably overtake us this off-season as well. If Carp can’t contribute in a fairly Carp-like manner it will be very difficult for the Cardinals to remain competitive. At least, not with a fairly flat payroll.
I just don’t see TLR allowing enough of the prospects to earn it to make up for the insufficient number of quality veterans, especially since he seems to have trouble distinguishing the quality ones from the marginal ones. Let me clarify that remark by saying I am not certain if the current crop of guys are good enough, but I doubt that TLR would allow enough of them to succeed even if they are. Now if Carp can come back and pitch regularly and effectively then we have a chance. Otherwise, the farm is going to have to really shine.
Those Pilgrims ain't lookin' so proud now...
by giveml on Sep 30, 2008 11:12 PM EDT up reply actions 0 recs
Carpenter
That example kinda illustrates what I am saying. Minnesota or Oakland would never have signed him to that deal. It isn’t working out well so far, but that’s beside the point. Minnesota or Oakland would never give Lohse 4/41.
Maybe we do slip out of the top third in payroll, but not by much. All I am saying is that we probably aren’t really going to go all in with prospects the same way some do. It may seem that we are to some, but that is probably because we haven’t really counted on the farm club much at all in the past 15 years or so.
We are doing things differently that we have in the past though. That is to Luhnow’s credit. Also agree that this method does not fit with TLR’s M.O. (No pun intended). I just think that drawing parallels to Minnesota or Oakland isn’t really an apples to apples comparison here.
by Merry CRasmus on Oct 1, 2008 2:00 AM EDT up reply actions 0 recs
I think you are right
but here is something to consider. The last year of Busch II the Cardinals payroll was $92.1M while Oakland was at $55.4M and Minnesota was at $56.2 M. By 2007 it was Cardinals $90.2M, Oakland $79.3M and Minnesota at $71.4M. It looks like they have both dropped back from last year.
In 2005 we were spending 50% more than the 9th place (in terms of payroll) team in the NL. By 2008, that percentage is down to 30%. So, is it a trend or not? Being in the top half of the league in payroll means a lot less if the bottom half gets closer to you when the numbers are as large as they are today. That’s what I mean by we will find out real soon. Will the Cardinals continue to trail the rest of the division in the rate of increase or will they spend comparatively more than they have the last three years? The lower rate of increase could be a trend or it could be something on an accident based on player mix and free agent willingness to sign in St. Louis.
Those Pilgrims ain't lookin' so proud now...
by giveml on Oct 1, 2008 9:39 AM EDT up reply actions 0 recs
Leadership etc
I think you left off one important factor in being a good manager. Team Preparation. It is everything in football, and has largely been ignored in baseball. However, Duncan/LaRussa do this in spades(according to what I read). I think that is a big part of the success. Also, you cannot quantify leadership, but it has to be a big part.
by Remember Kenny B on Sep 20, 2008 7:25 PM EDT reply actions 0 recs
New metrics
Thank you all for the diary and the discussions. It was fun to read and thought provoking. It is interesting that some of you are calling for new types of metrics to be used in quatifying/qualifying manager effectiveness. Maybe it would be something like “dumb moves that lead to a loss” or “smart moves that lead to a win”. Of course defining what dumb/smart move would be tough, and so would determining what lead to a win exactly.
I agree that even though Pyth and salary v. performance are not perfect measures, they do provide some information as long as they are used properly . One thing I would like to see is more studies on the sensitivity of measures.
born Dodger blue, now dyed Cardinals red
by totalloser on Sep 21, 2008 9:29 AM EDT reply actions 0 recs
Thanks, John Hadley.
Very in depth analysis.
Great diary (or whatever), giveml.
hecanthithecanthithecanthithecanthit
by Alxfritz on Sep 21, 2008 11:33 AM EDT up reply actions 0 recs
a question about pythag...
please forgive me if this seems like a dumb question; i still have far from a great understanding of the more sophisticated statistics that are out there, and i use this blog more for education than to add to the discussion.
that said, i am confused about the original intent of the pythagorean win expectancy measure. if i’m right, the idea is to find a formula that uses runs scored and allowed (which i guess you could call the “raw performance” of the team over the course of the season) as inputs and consistently comes up with a theoretical record that compares well to actual the actual record. if i’m right, the measure of the pythag formula lies in its gelling well with actual records across baseball history. the formula is supposed to tell you, loosely, the relationship between run differential and record?
was it originally developed with the hope it would be predictive, or was it purely for looking at the past?
by mattybobo on Sep 22, 2008 11:25 AM EDT reply actions 0 recs
What it's best
at is simply estimating wins and losses if you don’t know the W/L numbers. Every year by pure chance several teams are over or under thanks to pure chance (1 SD is like 6 games I think) and every year fans of that team attempt to explain it away as not luck.
The limits of reliever leveraging fall short of this though, and of course “bad relievers” get used in blowouts if you look in hindsight (they have to have given up lots of runs or it there wouldn’t be a bunch of runs given up) and “good relievers” get used in close wins. Constructing a team to win close games and get blown out would be kind of stupid anyway.
It does help show things like win contributions of individual players and it’s more predictive than actual record up until 140 games according to Clay Davenport. PythagenPat (W% = Rx/(Rx + RAx)
where x = (RPG).287) is better.
But really, if you want to look at talent estimates, add up individual projections. As a quick and dirty version it’s OK.
by haltz on Sep 22, 2008 12:10 PM EDT up reply actions 0 recs
I don't have time to look
for links, but a lot of that comes from MGL, Sal at THT and Tango’s sabermetric wiki. There are a lot of good discussions on the book blog if you are more interested.
by haltz on Sep 22, 2008 12:13 PM EDT up reply actions 0 recs
An improvement on Pythagorus...
I wonder if you couldn’t clean up Pythag by just eliminating statistical outliers. The problem there is that you pretend those games didn’t happen. You could set those games at your mean…or perhaps set them at a pre determined ‘high’ or ‘low’ range rather than using the actual runs scored or runs allowed, which tends to skew the data. Or how about wiping all runs allowed and runs created past a certain ‘lead’ in a game. IOW, you get no credit for piling on 5 more runs on a 5 run lead in the 9th inning…and simillarly you don’t get hammered for giving up those 5 runs? Seems like there ought to be a way to get Pythagorous to spit out the number we’re looking for. D.GOOCH
-- GOOCH
by GOOCH24 on Sep 28, 2008 11:57 PM EDT reply actions 0 recs

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