On Opportunity Costs
by kindred on Aug 22, 2008 12:33 AM EDT
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Printin the comments of yesterday's main thread, LB made an important statement here, which i'll excerpt:
a factor i completely overlooked in the main post is the high opportunity cost that attends any long-term deal that’s handed out to a pitcher. when you lock in a mediocrity (or worse) with a long-term guaranteed deal, it costs another, potentially better player a chance to come in and upgrade your organization.
he goes on to say that opportunity costs go both ways, which is definitely true. i replied in that thread trying to flesh out that point, but i think that it might get missed by a lot of people since i posted it late at night towards the bottom of the thread. but here's what i said with a few improvements:
herein lies the problem with citing opportunity costs: you never know in which direction those might point, because none of us have perfect information ahead of time. the entire point of using the concept of opportunity costs as a decision-making tool assumes that actors act rationally, and actors can only act rationally if they have complete (or near complete) information about the outcomes of the alternatives in front of them. those assumptions don’t hold here.
as examples: nearly everyone here (including me) decried the Looper signing at the time, and yet we got one above-average relief season out of him and are in the middle of getting two roughly average starting seasons, all well below the established market value for those levels of production. nearly everyone here hated the Wellemeyer signing last year (including me) because he was gonna take a spot away from a younger player who had more room to develop. then everybody hated his movement from the bullpen to the rotation for the same reason (even more: he was replacing Kid Reyes). Welly and Loop have been pretty huge successes for us, given the cost and the performance of the players they replaced. Encarnacion (even before his unfortunate injury) and Kennedy have not been. Piniero, in my view, is in the middle.
several years ago, the Cards decided not to sign Burnett because he wanted a fifth year added on to the contract. some here supported that decision and some opposed it. in retrospect, given the contracts to pitchers like Suppan, Batista, and Silva, the Cards should've either included the 5th year or bumped up their offered Average Annual Value of the contract by offering more money over 4 years. but it was impossible to know at the time: Burnett had a history of injuries and inconsistent performance. if we'd had Burnett for the past three years, we might've been better able to absorb the injuries to Carp, Mulder, and Wainwright over the past two years. then again, maybe Waino never would've made it into the rotation. maybe Reyes and/or Wainwright would've been traded for somebody else.
all of these are opportunity costs of a selected action. some of them might've worked out. some of them might not have. the point is, you never know beforehand, so simply citing “opportunity costs” without qualification — or even definition — doesn’t really mean anything.
so if we hadn’t signed Welly and Looper (or if we would've signed Suppan, Batista, Silva, or Burnett) we would’ve suffered the opportunity cost of losing (or gaining) the marginal benefit of their production over their replacements. in some cases, that would have been a net gain. in some cases, it would have been a net loss. both the positive and negative gains are examples of opportunity costs, but that fact alone doesn’t tell us anything about whether or not we should sign FAs in the future, or simply promote from within.
the point is, as LB mentioned but didn't really elaborate, opportunity costs run in both directions. we’re dealing with imperfect information here and can’t predict future performances with certainty, so simply citing “opportunity cost” as the sole or primary reason not to sign a FA (or as a reason *to* sign one) is nothing more than a rationale for a previously determined preference. there's a word for that: "bias". it would be just as (in)valid to say that playing an unproven prospect rather than signing an established vet entails an opportunity cost, albeit in the opposite direction, and that would be a bias as well.
the concept of opportunity costs is powerful in its simplicity, but we need to understand what it really means. many on this board -- including me at times -- are biased in favor of player development over signing players with established levels of mediocre performance. sometimes those decisions are correct; sometimes they aren’t. but the concept of opportunity costs is value-free; it doesn’t automatically swing in either direction. opportunity costs should be part of an argument when discussing roster management decisions, and should be used in the context of predicting player performance (and, hopefully, measuring that projected performance in context of the marginal monetary costs). otherwise, it doesn't really help us, and can in fact cloud our judgment.
anyways, yeah. we all have biases, but let’s be careful not to let them sway our judgments too much. especially when we’re tossing out "scientific" theorems in support of our ideas.
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i think you're missing my point kindred
the point i was trying to make is that seemingly “safe” decisions - e.g., resigning suppan, or resigning pineiro, or (hypothetically) resigning looper / lohse -- carry a large risk that most people overlook: the risk that you squander an opportunity to improve, by locking up roster spots and payroll in a proven, but mediocre, assets. i placed emphasis on that side of the equation because everyone recognizes the risk inherent on the other side of the equation, ie the risk in using unproven talent - a significant portion of those guys will flop. casting your lot with unproven talent is risky, and we all get that. but most of us overlook the risk involved in “playing it safe” with proven players.
i never claimed to be presenting a “scientific” theorem. but i did cite a number of specific examples in which the risk involved in the “play it safe” strategy would have hurt the cardinals in the long-term. i haven’t seen you cite specific examples of the opposite - ie, a case where the “play it safe” strategy helped a team in the long-term. if i have a bias, it’s based on my read of the empirical evidence rather than on abstract principle: to my eye, teams that load up on mediocre free-agent veterans (particularly pitchers) have a poor track record.
if you have the opposite bias, i’d be curious to know what it’s based on.
i think you've missed my point...
… which was that the concept of opportunity costs is value-free. it shouldn’t be cited as part of an organizational philosophy, i.e. a tendency towards playing the kids over mediocre vets or vice versa. it only applies in single, specific situations when two (or more) options are known and clearly available. sometimes we have that: giving Wainwright’s starting spot and Reyes’ roster spot to Sidney Ponson, or pitching Flores against a lefty instead of Mac. other times, the options aren’t so stark. but even when the alternatives are clear, we’re still playing probabilities, and that’s really the more important part of the analysis.
i wasn’t advocating signing mediocre free agents, nor was i advocating tossing two rookies into the starting rotation every year. i was simply questioning the way that the concept of opportunity costs is often used in these discussions.
and i definitely wasn’t specifically picking on you. in fact, i specifically acknowledged that you understood both sides of the coin. but on this board as a whole, and most sports discussion forums, there seems to be a bias present which has been dubbed elsewhere as “over-valuing one’s own prospects”.
as for cases where the “play it safe” strategy helping a team in the long-run, i would (and did) cite Looper’s much-derided deal. the two contracts that we did give Suppan are very good examples, i think. signing Lohse this off-season qualifies, i think, although you might question how “long-term” that helps us; i guess that depends on whether we make the playoffs this year (and thus generate higher revenues which can be used for improving the club in the future), and what we do with the draft picks we’ll get when he leaves. signing Welly has brought strong dividends for a year and a half so far.
but the point isn’t to play a tit-for-tat game. the point is simply that we often use the concept improperly. a good use for it might be: we could spend $13mn/year for the next 4 years to sign AJ Burnett, thereby blocking one of our younger pitchers, and also preventing us from signing a player like Furcal or Hudson. so, do we expect the marginal gain from Burnett over, say, Garcia to be higher than the marginal gain from Furcal over, say, Brendan Ryan? if so, then we should sign Burnett. if not, then we should direct that money towards Furcal.
obviously that example wouldn’t hold in the real world, because there are a lot more free agent options than just Burnett and Furcal, and there are a lot more in-house options than just Garcia and Ryan.
now, if we were going to try to create a more unified organizational philosophy, then we should be talking about variances in performances (which are very high for prospects, and much lower for established vets). maybe we take some gambles with prospects in areas in which our farm system is deep, because even though the variances are higher for prospects, the chances that one of them will pan out is much stronger. in areas where the farm system is thin (e.g. middle infield) a known, mediocre quantity may be much preferred, because if your one decent prospect doesn’t develop, you’re just screwed.
we haven’t even talked about risk-aversion, and other issues involved in here. but all of them affect the concept of opportunity costs. as i mentioned, high levels of information are required before we can even figure out what the opportunity costs of a given action might be. so while it might be appropriate to say that the opportunity cost of keeping Edmonds would’ve been limiting Ankiel’s playing time, that doesn’t really get us closer to determining whether or not it was a good idea. it doesn’t really mean anything, because “Edmonds” and “Ankiel” are merely categories at this point, not defined values. to get to that point we’ve got to do a bunch more analysis.
as for my bias… i’d say it depends on the situation. but overall, my bias is to trust people who have more information and experience than i have, especially since they are ones who are incentivized to make the right choices. so, i’ll generally (not always!) side with front office decisions, because i assume that they have thought out all these issues, run much more statistical analysis than i have, determined net present values of contracts and examined future performance prediction models.
that doesn’t mean that they’ll always be right, because we’re dealing with probabilities and not certainties. but it does mean that they have a greater chance of being correct in more instances over time than any of us, who don’t do this for a living and aren’t privy to all the information at their disposal.
and yes, i know that that’s a bias. but i think it’s defensible as a sort of intellectual short-hand: i basically out-source my baseball decisions to those with greater knowledge and time. it’s the same reason i read this site instead of starting my own, or read BP and HT rather than doing my own in-depth analysis.
(and the “scientific” theorems bit was more of a tongue-in-cheek jab at social science, and the enormous assumptions you must make in those disciplines before you can study anything; and i say that as a budding social scientist. it wasn’t directed at any poster here. i should’ve made that clear.)
The variance for vets
As it pertains to pitchers, the variance is a lot greater than many people believe it to be. Pitchers burn out without much warning with regularity. The examples are everywhere. Doesn’t mean that it is bad to invest in pitching, but it is a venture full of risks.
Going past all that and looking at the Cardinals in 2009, I look at it like this…
Pitching – Have a number of possible resources available in the higher levels. Investing long term on pitchers is expensive and presents greater variance than hitters. So stick to short term deals to build depth and, beyond that, trust what you have. What we have could be better than we can add.
Middle infield – Have little with the big club, or the higher levels, that you are comfortable counting on. As it stands now, I feel the MI restrains the upper limit this offense can achieve considerably, and nothing we have in the system suggests this can be improved internally by any significant degree. Have a surplus in the outfield to trade from, or dollars to spend in free agency. I’d like to see the Cardinals take their risks here. Going back to the opportunity costs school of thought, I think the risks of doing nothing, or little, here are much, much greater than it is with pitching.
by Merry CRasmus on Aug 22, 2008 3:03 PM EDT up reply actions
Also,
Can’t opportunity costs be increased or decreased by the potential of the players being allowed or deined the opportunity? For instance: Jim Edmonds is gone, and although his production had been horrific for a long time, it was reasonable to expect him to bounce back somewhat, however the opportunity cost of him clogging CF was incredibly high considering Ankiel, Schumaker, and Rasmus all could have reproduced or outproduced him, wheras the signing of Looper or Wellenmeyer only blocked A. Reyes (an unknown quantity at the very best) and Brad Thompson (consistent slightly worse mediocrity),
Space.
It's a problem we face.
So we never go anywhere.
We just stay in one place.
kind of...
… but opportunity costs don’t really “increase” or “decrease”. opportunity cost is a static measure; it’s simply a means of comparing one thing to another.
but you can’t compare things if you don’t have information about them. so, it was an obvious choice to trade Edmonds this off-season, but it would’ve been a very risky decision to trade him in the off-season after the ‘06 season. that extra year gave us much more information about the relative abilities of Ankiel, Schu, Luddy, and Rasmus that we didn’t have the year before. it also gave us more information about Edmonds’ decline (although that seems to have reversed in Chicago). so the decision became pretty easy last year, but would’ve been difficult the year before.
when we’re dealing with prospects, we have almost no information about their future MLB performance, because they haven’t established a track record from which we can extrapolate. so the risks of mis-calculating are much higher. so even getting to the point where we can set up a comparison between those players and players with established levels of performance, and be confident of the result, is difficult.
here’s an example: the opportunity cost of drafting player A is that you can’t draft player B. that is a true statement, but it doesn’t really tell us anything at all about whether we should draft player A or B, because those quantities are undefined. in order to make the decision, we take a host of information like statistical performance, quality of opposition, raw athletic skills, psychological make-up, etc. and try to project what their performance will be down the line. some guys, like Pete Kozma, project to be consistent if unremarkable players because their skills are already well-developed. other guys, like Daryl Jones, don’t really project at all, because their ability (at draft time) is so raw and untapped.
so the important thing isn’t the opportunity cost; the important thing is the projection abilities, and how confident we can be in our predictions.
apples to oranges
your example -- “the opportunity cost of drafting player A is that you can’t draft player B” -- doesn’t really map to the opportunity cost of spending $40m on a big-league pitcher. it’s true that every draft choice carries an opportunity cost, but it’s just a one-time cost - you select a player with your 1st round pick, but next year you’ll have another 1st round pick and another slate of players to choose from.
but if you lock up a pitcher at $10m a year for four years, you are tying up not only present opportunities but also future ones. that’s a much higher cost.
i would also tend to disagree with your opinion that “when we’re dealing with prospects, we have almost no information about their future MLB performance, because they haven’t established a track record from which we can extrapolate.” in truth, we have a ton of information -- we have scouted their physical skills (how hard they throw, how fast they run, etc etc), and we have their minor-league performance. that information doesn’t tell us exactly how a player will perform, but it enables us to establish probabilities and make informed choices. based on what you are saying here, it sounds like you think that chris perez and mark worrell were equivalent commodities at the start of this year, because neither one had a big-league track record. i don’t know if you really believe that (i suspect you don’t), but if you do i don’t share your opinion.
and the corollary to this is that a big-league track record -- much like minor-league performance - only helps you establish probabilities. it doesn’t guarantee anything. barry zito had an exemplary track record heading in 2007, while todd wellemeyer had an awful one; which pitcher would you rather have now? (duh.) so we never have perfect information on which to base our decisions; we always have to make our best guess.
but the cost of guessing wrong is much greater when you lock a player up for 4 years -- and that’s why opportunity cost is different when discussing $40m contracts than when we discuss prospects. if a prospect flops, you sustain a present-year opportunity cost (he takes a roster spot that could have gone to somebody else) but you don’t lose future-year opportunity - you just dump the prospect and try somebody new in the future.
i think this is the crux of our disagreement. it’s true that opportunity cost always exists, but that cost escalates with your investment. a draft pick? low investment, low opportunity cost. a 4 yrs / $40m deal with a free agent? high investment, high opportunity cost.
i don't think we're very far apart...
… but i would argue that the common discussion of opportunity costs is under-emphasizing one whole side to it.
to use your example, a player locked up for 4/$40, yes there is a higher investment in money and years in that case than there is with any one prospect in any one year. but it’s not as simple as that. quality major league players with established track records of success are relatively difficult to come by. and for every Barry Zito who flops, there’s a Johan Santana and a Roger Clemens who lives up to his contract. the point is, when you sign a player with an established track record, you have a very clear idea of what you’re getting. and if he doesn’t pan out, you still have your prospect to plug in. you’ve lost some money, but not performance (at least from that position).
now if you don’t sign the free agent, you’re stuck with the prospect and there’s very little you can do if he doesn’t pan out. you’re just sort of stuck with whatever level of production they give. maybe you can swing a trade, but if you do that you will most likely be adding salary AND depleting the prospect base for less service time, which is a much bigger cost than if you’d just signed the free agent. not just that, but you’ve lost that extra marginal production for not one year, but potentially for four years, since there is no guarantee that another player of the same caliber can be had at the same price in next year’s free agency. in fact, it’s rare that that occurs, especially for upper-bound talents. but even if there is one, you can logically (and consistently) make the same argument against signing the player in the second year that you made against signing the player in the first year, and never end up signing anybody to a multi-year deal.
so here’s the question: is it more likely that we will be able to accurately predict the performance of a major-leaguer with 6 years of service time, or a prospect? obviously, the vet. not that we’re going to be correct 100% of the time, but we’re talking probabilities here, and over the past few years there have been enough “can’t-miss” top prospects flame out or at least not live up to expectations (Pie, Gordon, Upton, Bailey) that even those with the most projectable skill sets still display a ton of variance (aside: while we certainly have lots of information regarding prospects, and we can certainly rank the accordingly, we don’t have that many statistically significant measure which would “guarantee” with a high level of probability what a prospect’s performance will be. we have guesses, and these can be informed, educated guesses with strong reasoning; but they are more often wrong than similar predictions made of veterans).
i would argue intuitively that the variance differential from prospects to vets would be near an order of magnitude. (i fully understand that that is an empirical claim, but i’ve never seen a study of it so i kinda have to go with my gut. i’d also suppose that the variance is greater for both prospects and vets for pitchers than position players.)
now given that, teams in certain situations and at certain levels of risk-aversion would be better off taking the known commodity than gambling. if a team gives Lohse the expected 4/$40 this off-season, they will do it knowing what to expect: 180-200 average-to-slightly-above average innings. to some teams, that relatively near-certainty is worth the cost of gambling that a given prospect will give the same level of production, or close enough that they can make up the difference with a signing at a different position.
in 2005, for example, the Cards knew that they were a very good team. they accepted the known quantities of Eckstein and Grudz — even though those quantities were mediocre — because they were in positions where they didn’t have to gamble at those positions; they were strong enough at other positions that the near-certain performance levels those players would bring was worth the cost. the pitching staff, however, was a greater concern. they felt like they had to gamble there, so they traded Haren for Mulder. they lost on that gamble, of course, but that has much more to do with Haren’s development than Mulder’s decline. IIRC, Haren wasn’t projected as a #1 or #2 pitcher; he was considered likely to be a #3 or #4. Jock was wrong, Beane was right, and Haren ended up being very good.
now if Burnett (say) was available as a FA in ‘04 instead of ’05, they could have just signed him and kept Haren, and i’m sure everyone would’ve been happy. but no pitcher of that quality was available to us in the FA market. so Jock felt that a gamble was necessary.
other teams, like the Marlins or Rays, are willing to gamble more often because their payroll constraints or other factors makes them more willing to take on additional risk. they can’t spend like the Yankees or Red Sox, so the only way for them to compete is to gamble and hope they get lucky often enough to stay in business. but the Yankees and the Red Sox almost never do that. it’s rare that those teams go into a season with no option at a given position other than a prospect. even this year, the Sox have Ellsbury and Lowrie, but they’ve also got Crisp and Lugo. they’ve got Buckholz, but they also signed Schilling and Colon. a few years ago, they had Papelbon, but they also had Foulke. in other words, they run their team much like the Cardinals, except they have higher resources and so they can be more thorough.
the Cards are in between the Marlins and the Sox. sometimes, it will make sense to spend for the known commodity. sometimes, it will make sense to gamble, not only with prospects but also with players recovering from injuries or down years whose salaries will be lower. but these decisions aren’t made in a vacuum. they are made on a player-by-player, position-by-position basis, given the team’s constraints of talent and money at the time.
and sometimes, the opportunity costs of inaction can be just as great as the opportunity costs of action, not just for one year, but for multiple years. that’s all i’m really saying. for example, if we don’t sign Hudson or Furcal this off-season, we might not have an opportunity to acquire another MI of the same caliber and similar price for several years.
it's essentially a short-term vs long-term thing
there are times when circumstance warrant the extra expense (in dollars, years, and opportunity) for a known quantity in order to increase the odds of short-term success. and there are other times when it makes sense to do the opposite - conserve opportunity in order to reap the highest long-term payoff. the devil’s gonna be in the details -- ie, in the projection that each of us assigns to given players, and the weight each of us assigns to short-term vs long-term rewards.
re-signing a guy like lohse for 3 to 4 years is a short-term strategy -- you gain stability for 2009, at the expense of opportunity in 2010 and beyond. by 2010 there’s a very good chance that lohse (or whomever) will be a worse pitcher than mcclellan, boggs, garcia, mortensen, and / or todd -- but we’ll be stuck with lohse because of the contract, much as we’re stuck with pineiro for 2009 because of the contract (and the mariners are stuck with jarrod washburn and carlos silva, the rangers are stuck with kevin millwood and v padilla, the cubs are stuck with jason marquis, the philies are stuck w/ adam eaton . . . . the examples abound). that’s the long-term price you pay for the (perceived) short-term stability. is the price worth it? in some circumstances, it might be. i don’t think it’s the right call for this particular organization at this point in its trajectory. young, cost-controlled pitching is the most valuable commodity in the game (witness how valuable wainwright is), and the cards have an opportunity to develop quite a bit of it. but you have to make a commitment to developing it, and be willing to embrace the risk.
the cards appear inclined to place their risk on the other side, ie the risk that a veteran pitcher will retain his current value over 3 or 4 years. assuming the cards do bring someone in, the best-case scenario (in my view) is to get a good season out of that pitcher in 2009 so that he’s still got trade value, and then move him to clear away space for somebody in 2010. that’d be the best of both worlds -- cover both bases, the short-term and the long-term.
i agree with you...
… but that strategy (i.e. sign a vet to a big multi-year contract, then trade him after one season) is pretty unlikely to happen in a non-Playstation world. given that we’re dealing with a second-best world, it seems likely that the Cards will either sign a vet to a multi-year deal and keep him for the duration of the contract, or else buy back into the reclamation pool for a guy like Jennings, Colon, Pavano, etc., hoping for a one-year fix. the third option, of course, is to sign a FA pitcher, and then trade a few prospects to improve the club elsewhere.
given that Looper and Lohse are likely leaving after this season, and Piniero after ‘09 (plus i’m sure his role in the rotation will be tenuous at best next year), there are going to be at least two rotation spots open within two years. the other three spots are currently taken by guys who have all been disabled this year, and in recent past years as well, and it seems reasonable that one or more them them will be injured again, given their histories.
on the other side, it’s pretty unlikely that all of Boggs/Garcia/Mortensen/Todd turn into average or above-average starters, esp. if the time horizon we’re talking about is only two years (it seems pretty clear to me that Mac’s staying in the pen). so if we’re counting on the group to fill two spots in a rotation for a competing team, and perform at or above-league average — roughly where Lohse and Loop have been this year, and better than AJ Burnett — perhaps as early as next season, might be a bit “irrationally exuberant,” to use Greenspan’s phrase. esp. since this organization prefers to wean prospect pitchers by putting them in the pen for a year or so.
so signing Burnett for 4/$48 wouldn’t have a significant effect (i don’t think) on whether or not these guys will get chances. as we’ve seen the past two seasons, injuries often occur, esp. to pitchers. i might rather take Lowe for 2/$20 or something, which should still leave the team with enough flexibility to sign a MI or two, long-term if necessary, and stay under the mythical $110mn mark. but that’s mostly just preference.
if we don’t sign somebody, everything is essentially riding on how well that group performs. it’s not hard to imagine a scenario in ‘09 where Carp and Welly get injured, and our rotation is suddenly Wainwright, Garcia, Mort, Boggs, Piniero. while that might be exciting, it’s probably not going to beat Zambrano, Harden, Lilly, Dempster, Marquis.
anyway, my (reasonable) ideal would be something like Carp, Waino, Lowe (on a 2/$20ish deal), Welly, Garcia/Boggs, with Piniero in long relief or traded for salary relief. and i’m sure you’d be reasonably happy with a situation like that too. at least one of the kids gets a chance in the rotation, but there’s still some protection. in that situation we’re sort of splitting the difference: we take on some salary in expectation of solid production from Lowe, but it isn’t an unreasonable burden in the short or long term. in other words, we’re minimizing risk in the short and long term, while still keeping some spots open for the kids to develop and mature.
put Todd and Mort in the AAA rotation, ready to step in if someone gets injured or otherwise falters, and put Boggs in the big-league pen. and/or package one of these guys with an OFer and/or Anderson to get a good MIFer.
agreed that not all of the kids will pan out
i didn’t phrase that very well. it’s almost certain that at least one or more of those pitchers i named (mcclellan / todd / boggs / garcia / mortensen) will fail to become league-average starting pitchers. but the odds are even better that at least one of them will stick -— if the cards will give them the opportunity. they have four veterans under control next year - carp, wainwright, wellemeyer, and pineiro. plan A should be to let the rookies fight it out for the #5 spot in spring training; the winner goes into the opening day rotation, and all the others are on call (either in the bullpen or at triple A) for when needs arise due to injury or failure. if they want an additional veteran around for insurance, they can sign someone on the order of ryan franklin - whom they picked up two years ago for $1m as a rotation backup (not as a setup man) - and stick him into the bullpen. guys like livan hernandez and josh fogg will be floating around for cheap this off-season; they could pick one up for pennies and have him on hand just in case of catastrophic failure, or just throw him away if they never need him.
come to think of it, they already have a guy like that in the organization -- brad thompson. they don’t even need an insurance policy.
using that approach as plan A would place the priority where it belongs - on the young, cost-controlled pitching with upside - while still covering the legitimate need for a safety net. but when you commit 4 years / $40m, you don’t have a safety net - that becomes your plan A, and the young pitchers are relegated to plans B, C, and D.
"the important thing is the projection abilities"
To give a specific example: If last year Wainwright had been blocked by Reyes, Wells, Looper and Suppan (but especially the first two), then the problem wouldn’t have been opportunity costs.
Assuming you project, say, Kyle Lohse to be a 100 ERA+ for 190 IP starting pitcher for the next three years, and the projection is sound, and you can sign him for a reasonable contract. Assume further that you’ve got a 2010 stud pitcher in Jaime Garcia, 120 ERA+ for 200 IP. Kyle Lohse is going to have value as trade bait in 2010. You are not tied to him.
The usual constraint in these discussions is thought to be cashflow. I’ve whined about the perception of this constraint enough elsewhere, that if somebody like CC Sabathia is available at a reasonable rate, you figure out a way to make it work. But putting that aside, one of the benefits of a strong farm system is that the Cardinals would have to be awfully stupid with free agents to put themselves at some sort of cashflow limit.
Your notion that discussing opportunity costs
is worthless b/c we lack certain information is troubling, to say the least. Opportunity costs are present, regardless of our level of information. In fact, the value of the opportunity cost is based on our level of information. We never have perfect information about anything. Is it your claim that our decisions shouldn’t be made on the basis of opportunity costs b/c we are lacking information? Then we would never make any decisions whatsoever. If I decide to go and see a movie tonight rather than staying home and playing Yahtzee, I’m making that decision based on imperfect information. I don’t know how good the movie will be. I don’t know how whether I’ll enjoy my Yahtzee opponents’ company. Yet, I make a rational decision that is based on imperfect information — and on the perceived value of the opportunity cost. To suggest that opportunity costs are nothing more than biases is overly simplistic. It’s true that opportunity costs can be based on biases but they could also be based on very objective criteria. Those criteria may be incomplete or imperfect, but to suggest that they’re worthless b/c they’re incomplete, or absent b/c they’re incomplete is simply not true. As I said, all of our decisions — rational or irrational, subjective or objective — are based on imperfect information.
This applies to making baseball decisions as well. We have no idea whether a player will get injured or perform at his 80% or 20% projection level. Nevertheless, the decision to sign or not sign, trade or trade for that player can be based on rational criteria, free from biases, and based on their respective opportunity costs.
The part of your argument with which I will agree is that we shouldn’t let our biases cloud our judgment. Or, I guess it’s ok if we do but a tremendous problem if Cards’ management does. However, confusing a “bias” with an “opportunity cost,” and taking the time to devalue the merit of opportunity costs, weakens your argument tremendously.
Opportunity cost is absolutely the way to make these decisions, baseball or otherwise and, frankly, as I pointed out earlier, it is how we make all of our decisions. Our information is always imperfect, and often wrong, but the decisions are made on the basis of the information we have at the time. As our decisions are necessarily made before the actions on which they’re based, they’re based on the perceived value of the action and the perceived value of the opportunity cost. If the perceived value of the action, though admittedly imperfect, is greater than the perceived value of the opportunity cost, we should take the action…period. It may turn out that the decision was a bad one if, for instance, the pitcher we just signed to a 5 year contract blows out his arm and never pitches again. However, that doesn’t mean that it was based on bias or that it wasn’t based on the perceived value of the opportunity cost.
If the perceived value of signing the player is greater than its perceived opportunity cost, we should sign the player…period. It may not work out. If the perceived value of either is based on bias, there’s a good chance it won’t. However, that doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t evaluate the value of that signing or the value of the opportunity cost.
i didn't say the things i said...
… or rather, the things you attribute to me. i never said that we can’t make a decision without perfect information, and i never said that we shouldn’t use the concept of opportunity costs in order to make decisions.
i’ll try to clarify, because i know my prose was murky and unorganized in places.
what we shouldn’t do is use opportunity costs as a skewed value which then defines the general organizational philosophy. the concept of opportunity costs doesn’t mean that we should never (or nearly never) sign free agents to multi-year deals. that’s not what it means. “opportunity costs” does not have a will or preference in general. it is a specific measure to be used in specific circumstances where there are two clear options. so, it might be appropriate to argue that we shouldn’t sign Lohse to a 4/$40mn deal because we will likely be able to get a similar level of production from Garcia or Boggs without the added cost. that’s a probabilistic question, and those in favor of signing Lohse put a certain probability on his value being higher relative to Garcia and Boggs’, while those opposed do the opposite. that’s a reasonable discussion, and not what i’m talking about.
but it just isn’t appropriate to say that we should be biased against signing any free agents (irrespective of quality or cost) to multi-year deals because we might be able to get a similar level of production sometime from some prospect. as you say, and i said before, if you apply this logic consistently you will never sign any free agent ever.
so this example statement makes absolutely no sense: “we should emphasize youth development because of opportunity costs.” that, literally, is a non sequitur.
the concept of opportunity costs applies to specific, not general circumstances. and the more information you have about the choices in front of you, the better you will be able to make the correct choice (this is all i said, and i don’t see why it’s controversial to you). so in order to have any rational discussion of opportunity costs, you’ve first got to know what your options are, including relative probabilities of success, injuries, costs, etc. simply saying that we shouldn’t sign AJ Burnett because of the “opportunity costs” doesn’t compute; if we’d had him the past three years, we would’ve been saved numerous starts by Wells, Kiesler, Thompson, Reyes, et al. that’s the opportunity cost of not signing him.
LB has said that he thinks that it’s likely that Garcia, Boggs, Mort, or Todd will be able to provide a similar level of production to a league-average starter at a lower cost. that implies a probabilistic performance calculation on his part. i think he’s probably right, but there is a reasonable argument to be made that he isn’t. either side could cite “opportunity costs” as evidence in their favor.
that’s because opportunity costs are value-free, and don’t skew in any one direction. therefore, the bulk of the discussion should be about other things: cost/benefit, willingness to assume risk, probabilistic assumptions (and whether they are valid or reasonable), etc. it’s only after those issues have been hashed out that opportunity costs ends up being relevant.
i just see too many people improperly using opportunity costs to reinforce their priors by skipping to the end of the argument they never made and declaring the matter closed, when it’s never really been opened.
(to reiterate again: i’m not accusing any specific person of doing this; it just seems like a general tendency among some people with a cursory knowledge of social science and some pretty clear biases. and i think that we, as individuals and as a community, can do better. as the saying goes, a little bit of knowledge can be more dangerous in its application than no knowledge at all.)
i haven't read a word of this thread
sort of like i haven’t yet dared to pick up lonesome dove.
but i’m guessing the entire argument is extremely nuanced and vocabularily liberal.
so…. ah hell, let’s give it a rec!
"so if you can’t understand what someone else is saying why don’t you just shut up about it instead of being a jerk-off?"
i tried to read it,
and about half way down my head asploded. so you know it’s good. i give it a recommendation as well.
I'm going to go try to find a puppy and kick it. - Brad Thompson AND THAT'S A WINNER!
I have been holding back on this one for a while
because I don’t really think much of what we are talking about is really related to opportunity cost per se. It has much more to do with cost/benefit analysis and risk evaluation. Opportunity cost is simply a way to measure the total costs of a purchase decision. The classic case is to decide the total cost of a college education. You can’t just add up the cost of tuition, books, room and board and come to a number. You have to look at what other opportunities you are forgoing to spend those four years in college. For example, do you have an option to work for $20,000 per year or for $100,000 per year? That lost income would be added into the total cost of going to college.
What we are spending our time talking about is the benefit side. Two college freshman have similar high school GPAs, similar test scores, and similar extracurricular resumes and have very different college outcomes. One could have a superior drive and work ethic, maybe some personality intangibles, and finish college with a high GPA, go on to medical school and make a ton of money. Thus, a very nice benefit from that same fixed cost. Another student could chase women, drink, do drugs, skip class, barely graduate and get a poor job that would not really justify the same fixed cost of going to college. Of course, that same underachieving carouser could end up as President of the United States.
So, what we are talking about here is really what benefit do you get from the costs you are willing to incur. Not promoting a prospect to the big-league roster because you signed a vet is only an opportunity cost of signing that veteran if it means you somehow lose that prospect (e.g. Rule V). The real opportunity cost to overspending on veterans is if that somehow limits your draft budget and prevents you from either drafting or signing the best available prospects. Or if it prevents you from acquiring a different asset such as another free agent.
To me, most of this post is about talent evaluation and performance prediction. I think this rapidly turns us back to the bias discussion. I am not convinced that a major league track record is an order of magnitude (read 10x) better predictor of future performance than a minor league track record. The annals of baseball history are full of players at all levels who have varied trememdously from their predicted level of performance for whatever reason. For every failed highly-touted prospect there is a Carl Pavano, or a Mike Hampton, or a Denny Neagle, or a Mark Mulder (last contract version). Some position players with track records suddenly fail for no obvious reason, such as Marcus Giles, or Felipe Lopez, or Cesar Izturis or Adam Kennedy (notice the common MI theme).
There are many minor leaguers who outperform their projected major league equivalences. Nothing in Chris Duncan’s minor league track record would have indicated he would have experienced the major league success he has enjoyed when healthy. Many posters here were very skeptical of Rick Ankiel’s ability to transfer his minor league success to the bigs. Giovanny Soto of the Cubs is another good example and I am sure there are many others.
So, we need to use all the scouting, statistical, and psychological measures available to us in all the various markets for both amateur and pro players to make the best decisions on who is really a player. That being said, it is pretty straightforward that the more money you lay out for a player, the more substantial the risks. I would personally prefer to sign the top 50 16 year-olds in Latin America than spend $40M on a veteran pitcher irrespective of his track record. Does that mean I have better information? No, it just means I have a bias towards low risk, high-reward types of moves. I would rather save my big paydays for the players I have signed and developed, than just go rent a mercenary. Mercenary is probably a bit harsh, but a $40M+ mistake can hurt a middle market franchise like the Cardinals for a long time. Missing on a prospect or several is easier to recover from.
Those Pilgrims ain't lookin' so proud now...
thanks...
… great post. that was sort of the nut i was trying to get at in the original post. the real discussion should be about cost versus benefit, probabilities of performance levels, and risk-aversion. opportunity costs come into play only after those other issues have basically been settled, and we have reasonable projections of performance at a given level of risk. it’s not nearly as simple as saying “we should/shouldn’t sign anybody b/c of the opportunity costs involved”. in a vacuum, that statement is nebulous. even in a specific context, it only makes sense if you’ve pre-determined those other factors.
in the coming years, the Cards should probably be a bit less risk-averse as they should have been in, say, 2005, because of the level of talent already on the roster and the team’s position in the division. but they should still be more risk-averse than the Pirates, because the chances of them succeeding with the talent already assembled is much greater. this is why signings like Tony Womack, Grudz, Izturis, and Springer make sense for teams in the Cards’ position, but would make nearly no sense for teams like the Pirates or Royals (and i say that realizing that the Royals signed Grudz and Izturis played for the Pirates last year).
maybe the “order of magnitude” thing was an exaggeration, but i was thinking in terms of all prospects projected to reach the bigs at some point, not just the already MLB-ready ones. and in that regard, your example of Duncan is actually along the same line as my point, since variance in performance can be both positive and negative. we wouldn’t have expected him to be anywhere near as good as he was, just as we wouldn’t have expected Pie to be anywhere near as bad he’s been. i still maintain that variance in performance for prospects is much higher than vets, but i’d be willing to concede if somebody knows of studies showing i’m wrong.
i'll accept giveml's delineation
whether you want to call it “opportunity cost,” “risk / benefit” analysis, or something else, i agree w/ ml that the risk of signing a veteran for $40m skews heavily toward the downward side, while the risk of giving a young player a chance skews upward. there are times when a veteran pitcher really is worth $40m to a franchise -- i thought aj burnett was one such case after the 2005 season - but they’re few and far between.
if the cards could get burnett for $10m a year today, i’d be all in favor - but that probably won’t be the case. burnett is walking away from a guaranteed $12m a year; he isn’t likely to accept less, and will only be available for less if his agent has badly misjudged the market (which is possible). $10m a year buys you carlos silva these days; it buys you jeff suppan, miguel batista, jarrod washburn. it buys you a guy whose upside is slightly above average -- and whose downside is way below average. it buys you braden looper; it buys you kyle lohse. i wouldn’t lock those guys up for multiple years at $10m per, and i hope the cards don’t do it.
agreed...
… no 4/$40 for Loop or Lohse. but that’s not where the Cards are at as an org. remember, they passed on Soup at those prices, despite the fact that he was a playoff hero, fan favorite, and probably would’ve taken something of a discount to stay. same with Matty Mo, and that was a 3 year deal. they passed on Burnett at those prices, as well as Washburn, Batista, Silva, Meche, Schmidt, and every other FA that has come down the pike in recent years. excepting Carp (and Waino, but that’s different), they haven’t given more than a two-year deal to any pitcher except Looper in recent years, and the AAV of that deal was like $4.5mn. they gave Piniero two years most for stability’s sake; they didn’t know Mort, Todd, Garcia, and Boggs were going to develop so fast, or that Lohse could be had so cheap, and they needed somebody this year while Carp was coming back.
in other words and given the history of the club, i don’t think the thing that you’re scared of has much chance of happening. if they go more than 2-3 years, it’s gonna be for a top-flight guy, and probably one who is home-grown or at least has some history with the team (the closest they got to signing any of those guys was Burnett). but that doesn’t mean that they can’t improve up the team with a FA on a shorter deal, or one with a lower AAV. that’s why i like Lowe, and think it’s somewhat plausible that they go after him. if not him, then somebody from the scrap-heap on a one-year deal.
yes, they've been very smart about this in the past
i hope they maintain their wits. but they also have a history of not quite landing the big fish -- hampton, pedro, aj burnett, jason schmidt all slipped through their fingers (and at least 2 of those 4 would have been flops anyway).
but here’s my concern. both Mo and by Strauss stated in the Wednesday chats that the cards will likely go outside the organization for a 5th arm to add to the 4 already under control heading into ‘09. based on past history, we should not count on the club to pony up for sabathia or sheets this off-season, nor (probably) burnett. that would seem to leave two possibilities: a trade, or a crappy mid-rotation free agent. we know how trades can work out (haren / mulder) . . . . and we are united in opposing a suppan- or morris-type signing. that’s what prompted my reaction. if they’re going to go outside the organization, most of the options seem very risky to me -- much more so than using the homegrown guys to build value.
Given the fairly stagnant level of payroll commitment
the Cardinals will have to be smarter than ever to make their self-imposed salary cap work. The last time the Cardinals led the division in payroll (according to USA Today), was 2005. Since that time every team in the division has seen their payroll grow more rapidly than the Cardinals. Using the same data, here is the total % increase in payroll since 2005 for each team in the division:
MIL 103%
CHI 36%
PIT 28%
CIN 20%
HOU 16%
STL 8%
The Cardinals are still second in the division in payroll and 11th in MLB, but the Cubs are currently outspending us by 20% and climbing. If the large market NL teams that are already outspending us, plus Philly who is just behind us, ever manage to run their franchises with some efficiency the Cardinals will have no choice but to win with homegrown talent.
I take my hat off to the ownership group for recognizing this, albeit somewhat belatedly, and adjusting their strategy accordingly. I think they have no long-term choice but to outperform other teams in talent identification and development. So far, so good, but we are just gettting started. That being said, I think the payroll is a tad on the low side given all the promises made when the new ballpark was being pimped, er, sold. I won’t bitch too much as long as they keep drafting and signing the best talent and working hard outside the U.S. to secure top prospects.
Those Pilgrims ain't lookin' so proud now...
baseline...
… you’re not quite comparing apples to apples. the Cards baseline was much higher than most of the teams in the division (maybe all of them) in ‘05, so it’s only natural that they’d grow faster. it’s kind of like the difference between GDP growth in the US and China. in order to have a proper perspective, you’ve got to look at starting points. in order for the Cards to have matched the Brewers’ growth, they’d have to have like a $200mn payroll.
the Cards still have the 2nd-highest payroll in the Central, and top 5 in the NL. they can certainly compete with that in the short and medium-run. the Cards can do very well with a $100-120mn payroll over the next 5 years or so. after that time, we’ll see what the rest of the league looks like. but i imagine that either other teams will pull back as they approach the Cards’ level, or else increased league-wide revenues will allow the Cards to push the payroll a bit higher.
this is not to say that your over-arching point of emphasizing homegrown talent isn’t proper. it is, and it always has been. that’s always been the case, and it always will be. but a bit of perspective is in order.
USA Today’s 2005 payroll for the Cardinals also includes ~$10 million extra for Cedeño and Walker.
Aside from the baseline stuff, after the poor drafting period from 2002-2004, they also didn’t have the kind of desirable MLB-ready trade bait necessary to make substantial (payroll) additions to their “core”.
I intentionally used 2005 as a baseline
because it was the last season before the opening of Busch III. We were lead to believe that the key to being able to remain competitive was the additional revenue from the new stadium.
Thanks to greenback for the info on Cedeno/Walker.
Those Pilgrims ain't lookin' so proud now...
question posed without ulterior motives...
… if the Cards had signed Pedro, Burnett, Schmidt, or Hampton, would you have opposed it at the time? perhaps Hampton b/c of the sheer unwieldiness of the contract (wasn’t it 7 years?), but that was as much a product of him demanding an otherwordly amount to pitch in Colorado in 2001 than anything. the Cards ( or another team) probably could’ve had him for much less if the Rockies weren’t bidding against themselves.
but the others — Pedro, Burnett, Schmidt — all seem like the sort of contracts that you and most others on this board would’ve defended. i probably would’ve too. and excepting injuries, which are more or less random and unpredictable, any of those signings would still be defensible after the fact except for maybe the Schmidt signing, since he was coming off of a fairly serious injury and a downturn in performance.
in other words, are you confident enough in Garcia/Boggs/Mort/Todd over the next 2-4 years that you’d encourage the front brass from not going after Sabathia/Sheets/Burnett/Lowe/Dempster if payroll allows for it? if so, and given the clear likelihood that Furcal re-signs with LA and Hudson re-signs with AZ, where would you have Mo spend $30mn?
the discussion has never been about sabathia or sheets
nor any other front-line starting pitcher. my initial post, to which this FanPost is a response, discusses why the cards should not make a major commitment to a mid-rotation picther -- lohse, looper, guys of that ilk. the guys you are talking about are not mid-rotation pitchers, so therefore it’s not nearly as likely that the cards can get comparable production out of one of their cost-controlled kids. totally different calculus.
if they were to go after one of those
as for the former f.a. pitchers you mentioned -- they’re front-line pitchers, not mid-rotation types, so you’re comparing apples to oranges. another factor is that those f.a.s came along when the cardinal organization was in a different place. when hampton, pedro, et al were on the market, the cards had a dominant team that was ready to win right away. in every case but one (schmidt after the 2006 season) the cards were coming off a 95- to 100-win season and an nlcs or world series appearance. to use burnett as an example, i strongly advocated signing him after the 2005 season, because the cards were in a situation where short-term opportunity outweighed long-term opportunity. they were a team that was already poised to win a championship - a dominant team in a weak league, coming off two consecutive 100-win seasons. but they also had a number of key players who were over 30 and / or in the final year of their contracts (suppan, mulder, edmonds). so they had an excellent opportunity to win it all in the near term, but the window of opportunity was about to close due to age / lapsing contracts - in short, their near-term opportunities were better than their long-term ones.
today the team’s short-term opportunity isn’t nearly as good. if they were to add c.c. sabathia, they would not instantly be serious world series contenders. they wouldn’t even instantly become the best team in the national league. sabathia would merely vault them into the pack along with several other good teams. by contrast, back in 2004-06 there weren’t any other good teams in the national league; the cards were already the best, and adding an ace would have vaulted them way ahead of the pack.
it always comes down to the same two questions: a) are you talking about a difference maker, as opposed to a guy who’s not much better (if at all) from a young player who’s already in the system; and b) is your near-term opportunity worth more than your long-term opportunity
i picked those as examples...
… b/c you did, viz. “but they also have a history of not quite landing the big fish — hampton, pedro, aj burnett, jason schmidt all slipped through their fingers (and at least 2 of those 4 would have been flops anyway).” this in response to my statement that the Cards have been one of the most cautious teams in the bigs w/r/t signing FA pitchers — esp. mediocre ones — to multi-year deals. if there’s an apples to orange comparison, it was made by you. i was merely trying to expand the point.
today’s comps to Hampton, Pedro, Burnett, Schmidt are basically the guys i listed: CC, Sheets, Dempster, Burnett, Lowe. and this season is roughly analogous, in my mind, to 2003. in both cases you had a team that was decimated by injuries and the declining performances of some of its older players. in both cases you had some significant turnover in personnel over the course of several years (02-04; 07-09). in 2004, it was clear that the Cards were a good team in need of some pitching depth. this was achieved by trading Drew for Marquis & King and signing Suppan, plus inserting Carp into the rotation. they then signed mediocre stop-gap players at several positions (Sanders, Womack), because they were strong enough elsewhere to overcome the relative lack of production from those spots. the next year, they won 100 games.
this year, the team is above-average, and near the top of the league on offense, despite the black hole in the MI. the roles have essentially been established for most of the offensive players (Lud, Skip, Ank), but the window to succeed with some of them is closing (e.g. expiring contracts or control in the next few years for Glaus, Ankiel, Welly). we are in need of pitching depth, and assuming a roughly equal injury distribution across the division, a team fielding CC, Carp, Waino, Welly, and Garcia in their rotation, and one of the first or second best offenses in the league, would certainly be favorites to win or at least very strongly challenge for the division title and, arguably, the World Series.
so if you can make a case for gambling long-term in order to gain short term in ’03, or even in ’05, then you can make a case that the same condition holds today.
now that’s not a reason to give Lohse 4/$40. but suppose that CC and Sheets are unsignable. the team can still be confident that a rotation founded on Carp, Waino, Welly can lead the team to contention for a playoff spot if the offense continues to be robust. but there’s still 360-400 innings from two starting spots that need to be filled with some quality; you can’t essentially give away 1 game per week due to a poor back-end of the rotation and still expect to contend. suppose that you think that some combination of Garcia and Boggs could give you something approaching league-average production over 160-180 of those innings at the minimum. you’ve still got 180-200 innings to fill. in this position, a team which must be considered likely to contend given reasonable health, the marginal difference between league-average innings-eater option A and let’s-roll-the-dice-and-hope-for-the-best prospect B (who was, until this season, not even really considered a viable prospect, e.g. Todd) could be very significant to your playoff chances. so even though his upside might not be great, the relative certainty of having, say, 180 average to slightly-above-average innings from Lowe (only once in his career as a starter has he been below average, and that was 2004) is a pretty valuable commodity. this doesn’t even factor in injury potentials, which make added depth with a reasonable certainty of average-or-better production even more attractive. so even if you’d prefer to only have him for one year, it’s easy to rationalize signing him for 2 or even 3 (tho not 4, given age) years in order to gain that stability. a similar argument could be made for signing Dempster, although he’s had less consistent success throughout his career and also more injuries. in either case, it seems likely (to me, at least) that either Lowe or Dempster would out-perform Todd or Mort over a 2-3 year time horizon (remember: Garcia and/or Boggs is already in the rotation, and the other would get time in the pen or as an injury/ineffectiveness replacement).
would it end up being the right decision? who knows. and yes, there are some trade-offs to consider and some opportunity costs involved. but just because it’s a multi-year deal to a pitcher not regarded as top-flight or front-line (at least to me) doesn’t mean that their marginal value added wouldn’t be significant.
especially since this team could survive offensively by re-signing Izturis or someone or his ilk, and has some money to spend. that extra marginal production could be very important, even if it’s coming from somebody who isn’t gonna contend for the Cy Young. as you mentioned today, this team would be nowhere near contention without the league-average steady hand of Looper, who was signed on a multi-year deal to which many observers were opposed.
it's funny you mention 2003
the cards after 2003 did the opposite of what you’re proposing -- they traded current-year value (drew and marrero) for future potential (marquis and wainwright). true, they also signed some present-year value in suppan and sanders, but those were both cheap 2-year deals worth less than $10m over the life of the deals. suppan’s included an optional 3rd year, and even with the option it was only a $9m deal -- not $40m, as is being discussed here. ie, they paid average value for average talent; they didn’t overpay for it, and thus hamstring themselves in future seasons.
another thing to consider re the sanders / suppa signings is that st louis did not have any farm system to speak of in 2003 - that’s why they went out and got wainwright in the first place. today they have viable prospects, but back then their best prospects were guys like jim journell and john gall. they didn’t have mlb-ready talent available, hence no choice but to sign some league-avg free agents. they paid a fair price, and they didn’t have equivalent talent available for less money - -hence, good signings.
bottom line is that their orientation after 2003 was more toward the future than toward the present. they went into the 2004 season with 3 reliable arms in the rotation - morris, woody williams, and suppan - plus a $500,000 crapshoot reclamation project (carp) who hadn’t pitched in nearly 2 seasons, and a 25-year-old crapshoot ex-prospect (marquis) who’d pitched himself out of the atlanta rotation and down to triple A. ie, they went with 3 established vets making market rate, plus 2 low-cost crapshoots. i’m advocating that they go into the 2009 season with 4 established market-rate guys (carp, wainer, welley, and pineiro) and 1 low-cost crapshoot -- a much less risky proposition than what they did after 2003.
it just so happened that it all fell into place for them; all their gambles paid off, so they had it both ways, success both in the current year and in future years.
I think you are making this WAAAAAYYYYY more complicated
than it really is. When a decision is made to sign a FA, it comes down to the money you have to spend, the money the player wants, and the need your organization has.
Its risk vs reward. Their is an inherent risk in signing a FA who has proven to be consistantly average, because you could have a young player for 6 million dollars less that could potentially put up similar numbers (i.e. Piniero vs Boggs?). If the organization has the money to spend to ensure mediocrity, then its a decision worth making. The Cardinals don’t have a flexible payroll though, so spending money for mediocrity, when it already sits in your farm system doesn’t seem to make much sense.
There is, likewise, the inherent risk that the young player isn’t nearly as good as average (Reyes). After experiencing a situation like that, teams often are willing to accept a safety player (Piniero) to plug into the roster.
I would personally say that any team with a pretty consistent payroll, can ill-afford to spend big money on mediocrity. Their much better off taking chances and paying money for potential. I think the the post-Jockety era has recognized this, hence the signings of several talented Caribbean players this offseason.
by CrimsonBirdFan on Aug 24, 2008 12:04 PM EDT reply actions
It seems like 90% of your problem above is pure semantics, though
You and lb seem to be fundamentally agreeing about how the team should look at cost/benefit of players and short term vs. long term planning. You just object to the use of the term ‘opportunity costs’, which you feel has been colloquialized from its technical definition as used by an economist.
They say that it's never too late, but you don't get any younger...
yes...
… but the other 10% is philosophical, it seems. we agree not to spend 4/$40 on Lohse/Loop. beyond that, there seem to be differences.
i don't think it's philosophical
i think we just have different thresholds for where we would commit major resources for current-year gain at the expense of future gain. you’d do it more readily than i would.
well...
… you do seem to be less risk-averse than i, which is a philosophical difference, albeit a marginal one.
i do think we see some different opportunities for the growth of the team. we look at this team and see a group with solid foundation among the position players and pitching staff for the next few years, but still with a few question marks in the field and on the mound. the team is now going to have some fairly significant payroll flexibility for the first time in years. basically, the team is faced with a choice: option A is to upgrade the MI and/or bullpen through free agency and go with the in-house starting pitching options we’ve got, trusting that at least some of them will pan out well enough to not sink the team. option B is to solidify and deepen the starting pitching options we’ve got and shore up the bullpen, recognizing that our offensive core is not going to change for the next few years and is already one of the best in the league. i think we both agree that the bullpen for next year will be helped by a lack of Izzy and/or Flores, and the permanent promotion of Perez and (likely) Motte, plus a continued high-leverage role for Mac, with the arrival of Salas (and hopefully Perdomo?) in sight if things continue to go well. some tweaks are still necessary on the margin — i.e. we likely need another LOOGY even if Johnson comes back strong — but that’s true of just about every season, and one of this organization’s strong suits is patching together a pretty good bullpen on the cheap.
the team has enough cash for one significant signing, so the real question seems to be: upgrade the MI, or upgrade the rotation. given the paucity of MI options — really only two clear upgrades available on the FA market, Furcal and O-Dog, both seem likely to re-up with their respective teams, and both have serious injury concerns besides — and the quick propensity for MIFers to decline, i’d side with spending the money on pitching. it’s unlikely that the team will be able to spring for CC or Sheets in money or years, but they can afford Lowe, Burnett, or Dempster.
they will likely be replacing two rotation spots this off-season, and i think we’re in agreement that it would better if Piniero wasn’t in the rotation as well, so in my mind there is certainly room for a free agent signing AND youth development (esp. since Piniero will certainly be gone after this season, and Welly also becomes a FA after ‘09, if i’m doing the figuring correctly). and if the prospects do pan out and are blocked, then we suddenly have enough depth to improve the MI through trades, dealing from our then-surplus in pitching, and/or OF. it’s possible that Lillibridge, Hu, or Zobrist could be available within an acceptable price range. or they could go after somebody like Renteria or Lugo, so long as Det/Bos picks up some salary. Garciaparra could also probably be had fairly cheaply on the FA market (if he can still play SS; i really don’t know).
the point is, if we have pitching depth, any of these scenarios (and others) are realistic. if we don’t have any pitching depth, then none of them are because we’ll be forced to hold on to every halfway decent guy in the system and hope that several beyond Garcia and Boggs become at least serviceable. plus we run the risk of having no choice other than to end up with more guys like Izturis, Miles, and Kennedy — i.e. spot holders who are relatively inexpensive and just effective enough to get by — because our trade options are very limited and good free agent MIFers are few and far between.
so it seems to me that the best way to improve the club while smoothing out assets for the short- and medium-run would be to acquire a #2-3 type pitcher — think, a mid-rotation guy with some upside — for several years. not 4/$40 for Loop or Lohse. but 2/$20, or even 2/$24 for Lowe, 3/$33 for Dempster, or 3/$39 (3/$42?) for Burnett (Oliver Perez could be another option, although he seems likely to get too many years in addition to the money). the team could absorb a contract like that, leave some spots open for the kids, and have the flexibility in talent (if not payroll) to adjust the composition of the talent base through trade if necessary, or to cover an injury or two without completely falling apart.
i admit that this line of thinking isn’t especially creative, and is somewhat risk-averse. but this team a year and a half removed from a World Series win, and has contended this season despite having play most of the year without their two best pitchers. they aren’t very far away from competing for another W.S. i don’t think, and acquiring a guy like Lowe or Burnett could make a substantial difference in that regard without overly restricting the team’s future flexibility. the team will likely lose some significant salary after ’09 with Piniero, Kennedy, and Glaus coming off the books, so there will still be some room to maneuver.
Or we could see what we have with the kids
Sign a couple of old guys on the FA market for Lohse-type $10-$15M/1 yr-type deals, ride out 2009, and then reinvest that money in 2010 when we are more sure what we have with the current crop. The only real downside of this strategy is that Glaus’ll be gone.
And I don’t think that anyone is really arguing against signing a difference-making pitcher. They’re arguing against going and signing someone like Lohse or Gil Meche.
They say that it's never too late, but you don't get any younger...
"difference maker"
any signing will make some sort of a difference. what i’m saying is that it doesn’t have to be a Cy Young-caliber player to have a significant difference, b/c of the ripple effect. a strong positive effect could be felt from a 2nd-tier pitcher, since it will reduce the amount of exposure given to relatively unknown quantities (e.g. Boggs). such a signing could also spread the risk out across several seasons instead of facing it all at once, beginning in about 8 months. if we get positive results from the kids, there will be places to play them, or they can be moved in exchange for other assets at other positions of need. and if we don’t get positive results, then we’re not stuck with a lost year.
another issue: to some issue extent baseball payrolls can be self-regenerative. if you keep winning, revenue streams remain high (esp. if you make the playoffs), and thus more money is available for future investment. if you gamble on the kids and lose, that money is gone, as is the expected positive return from investing it in future assets. this, also, is an opportunity cost of carrying excessive risk. at a certain margin, it makes sense to gamble (e.g. Marlins). but i don’t think the Cardinals are at that margin. i think they are further along the curve.
but as i say, different people have different levels of risk-aversion. whatever.
i haven’t yet heard what i think might be the strongest argument in favor of taking on extra risk by playing the kids: that locking up Luddy and Ankiel, and possibly Rasmus, should be near the top of the priority list. extending all of them might not be possible if the team has 2 pitchers on the roster making $10+mn.
but i suspect that one of the reasons i haven’t heard it proposed it because it’s self-defeating: if the argument is to maximize use of cheap cost-controlled young talent, than that argument should apply to position players as well as pitchers, and we have a pretty strong crop of OF prospects from which we could expect league-average or better production. this line of reasoning would maybe suggest that we sign Ankiel OR Ludwick, but not both, and then go year-to-year with Rasmus until the Ank/Lud contract expires or money is freed up elsewhere.
but this argument is also easily applied against signing a MIF free agent also.
Just to play the devil's advocate
Consistency along with mediocrity can be extremely valuable. In 2007 Anthony Reyes accumulated a record of 0-8 with a 6.08 ERA before his first trip to the minors, while Kip Wells had lost ten games by the beginning of june. If the cardinals had league average instead of those two, they likely would have made the playoffs despite all the other problems.
The one thing that could most easily destroy this team is another bout of injuries to their aces. It happened in 2007 and 2008. If the team signs any one of Burnett, Sheets or Lowe, they will have yet another high-level starter with an injury history.
Space.
It's a problem we face.
So we never go anywhere.
We just stay in one place.
in one of these posts...
… i specifically mentioned an assumption that injuries would be relatively random, i.e. just as likely to happen to a vet or a prospect. obviously some players are more injury-prone than others but i don’t think that, as a category, you can say that vets are more — or less — likely to be injured. injury concerns sort of drop out of the model i’m proposing.
but even if they didn’t drop out, it doesn’t take away from my overall argument, which is to build depth. if you sign Lowe and he gets hurt, then you just play the prospect you would’ve played anyway, and there is no decrease in production. you’ve lost some money, but not performance.
Random between vets and prospects
But I would argue it is not random between pitchers and position players. In any discussion involving long term commitments, and which positions to allocate a limited number of dollars to, I think injury risk has to fit into the model to some extent. Pitchers carry more risk. The more years you are considering offering, the more this rings true.
That’s a big reason I advocate addressing middle infield before pitching. Probably second, only to the complete lack of internal options the system provides for MI in the immediate to mid term. Those 2 factors are huge, in my mind. I suspect that our opportunity costs in the MI are lower than just about anyone else in the league. That’s why my expectation is that they’ll view it as the top priority for filling externally.
by Merry CRasmus on Aug 26, 2008 3:15 PM EDT up reply actions
sure, but...
… the flip side of that coin is that MIFers have much more sudden rates of decline than other players (not sure if that is true when compared to pitchers, but since we’re only talking about a pretty select group of 2nd-tier pitchers, and not yer 5th-man scrubs, it seems likely). we’ve learned that lesson with Kennedy. the TIgers are learning it with Renteria (perhaps). the Blue Jays are learning it with Eckstein. Cabrera is having a bad year.
the only marked MI improvements on the free agent market are Furcal and Hudson. besides that fact that both are likely to re-up with their current teams, both are on the wrong side of 30, and both have lengthy injury histories.
and even there, the improvements aren’t mind-blowing given the cost. Orlando Hudson has had three above-average offensive seasons in his career (the last three), and in none of them has he had an OPS+ above 109. that’s better than Miles, sure, but is it a big enough difference to give him $10+mn a year for four years more than Miles? Furcal has been great this year, but he’s only played in 32 games. last year his OPS+ in 136 games was… 76. that’s right, nearly exactly the same as Adam Kennedy’s this year. his career high was a full season is 107. you wanna give him 4/$48? for league-average offense and a huge injury risk?
Orlando Cabrera, i hear you say. he’s durable, but has been below league-average in every season since 2003. this year, his OPS+ is 79, and he’s gonna be 34 next year. you want to give him a multi-year deal? who else is there? Nomar and Kent are both old, injury-prone, and below average offensively and defensively. Jack Wilson has a fairly big contract and will require several legit prospects in a trade (if the Bucs will even deal with us).
the best bet for acquiring a MIF upgrade would seem to be targeting Hu, Lillibridge, or Zobrist. but to do that, you’ll have to trade a pitcher or two. and if you do that, you’ll need to sign somebody. and now we’re back where we started.
not only that, but the offense is fine. top 3 in the league in runs and ops. that’s plenty. we could certainly use an upgrade, but i don’t think signing Furcal, O-Dog, or Cabrera to multi-year deals is the best use of resources.
unless i’m missing something and you’ve got a better plan than the ones i’m thinking of.
Risks either way
There is no rule that says we have to give anybody a 4-5 year deal. We could use the fact that we have more dollars free and use those dollars to frontload contracts with cheap options. Don’t necessarily want to lock anyone into the lineup/rotation until 2012/2013, SS or pitcher.
I point out the risks with pitchers, and I think they are present whether you deal with top of the rotation, 2nd tier, or bottom. I don’t advocate staying away from the market altogether, just advocate limiting yourself to a short term deal (1-2 years).
You point out the risks with middle infielders. I agree with the overall point that there is a decline to be expected there as well, though I would nitpick on some of the examples. For example, Eckstein has been exactly what the Blue Jays should have expected him to be. Renteria has had a few years not all that unlike this one, so it remains to be seen with him.
I think it is important to acknowledge that a SS that can hit around a 100 OPS+ is not that common. League average offense for shortstop should not be confused for being average. Going off the cuff here, but I suspect the SS average lies somewhere around 80-85. If you have one that can put up a 100 ops+ then you have a big leg up on most of the league, especially if they can perform defensively too. I choose the SS that can OPS+ 100, and play defense, over the outfielder that can OPS+ 115.
To cut to the chase, I think more of Furcal than you do. I think it could be worth setting his market value if you can get him for 2 years, possibly a third year as an option. His injury, I am guessing, could allow you to keep the years short if the dollars are there.
You mention the 76 OPS+ in 2007. If you pool his limited 2008 AB’s that you refer to with that, he is right around 100. Which is right around where he has been since 2003. Defensively he is solid, so he should be able to stick. I think with the current makeup of this team, the OBP side of the equation is much more important to us in our shortstop and that Furcal passes the test there. I view him as a great fit, as long as he is healthy.
I share reservations about Hudson and especially Cabrera. If a trade with Peralta is really a possibility, then I talk. I hate talking about trades, because both sides have to want it…..but we can certainly help them with some cost controlled bats from our system. I think Texas is a possible trade partner as well. I’m sure there are others too.
by Merry CRasmus on Aug 26, 2008 10:36 PM EDT up reply actions
OPS+
I threw the 115+ OPS number for outfielder pretty haphazardly. I’d really set the threshhold higher than that, though not exactly sure how much. Just said it to make the overall point regarding the scarcity of offensive production from the shortstop position, but I think I undersold how much I value reasonable production (coupled with defense) from a shortstop.
by Merry CRasmus on Aug 26, 2008 10:57 PM EDT up reply actions
points taken...
… and i’ve argued in favor of signing Furcal in the past along pretty much the same grounds. by all rights, he’s still at least average defensively, and above-average for his position with the stick.
but i’ve come to be persuaded by the argument that MIFers tend to decline very quickly and without much warning. given that, the fact that he has had several major injuries during the course his career and is in fact rehabbing from one now, the fact that he wants to stay with his present team (and they want him), and the fact that it will likely cost over 4/$40 to get him (or 3/$36, if you’d prefer), and especially given the present pressing needs of the club, which aren’t on the offensive side of the team, and i think you could get by with a much cheaper alternative, similar to how the Cards have gotten by with Iz2, Belly, Eck, Grudz, and Womack over the course of recent years. are they world-beaters? nope. but that class of player is adequate enough for a team with so much offense in other positions that it’s good enough.
to me, the question is whether you think you can get a greater marginal upgrade for your money by investing in pitching or MI. given the scant options in the MI, the quality of some of the available 2nd-tier FA pitchers who might be available at below-market prices if teams blow their wads on CC and Sheets, and the flexibility that signing a pitcher would provide for trading out of a surplus, it seems to me like the bigger marginal gains can be had by going after a pitcher.
that might not be accurate. maybe somebody with more time on their hands can calculate Furcal’s runs created and runs prevented over the past, say, three seasons and compare them to the league average and replacement level at SS so we have a firmer grasp of his worth. or better yet, compare BP’s median projections for him to BP’s projections for Hu, Lillibridge, Zobrist, Izturis, Wilson, Cabrera. basically, see what margins we’re talking about here. then we could better compare to the marginal increase in production from Garcia, say, to Lowe. then after calculating the NPV of the likely contracts for Furcal and Lowe, we’d have a better comparison. anybody got the time for a project like that? unfortunately, i don’t right now. maybe over Christmas Break.
you might be right. i might be wrong. if there were more options of the caliber of Furcal out there that we might have a shot at signing, then i might agree with the approach at least. but basically, once you get past Furcal there aren’t really any other very good options out there. i personally doubt that Furcal even makes it to FA, although i suppose that remains to be seen.
anybody got the time for a project like that? unfortunately, i don’t right now.
VEB, now with 100% recommended daily value of irony.
"so if you can’t understand what someone else is saying why don’t you just shut up about it instead of being a jerk-off?"
wordiness is next to godliness
haha...
… in truth, these replies take about 10-20 minutes, especially after several glasses of wine. the words just flow.
which probably doesn’t say much for my reasoning skills, or the clarity of my prose.
but hey: i’m just having some fun is all.
It all depends
On what the dollars are, what the years are, and what prospects would be required to deal in trades. We both make assumptions, whether stated or not, that kinda shape our views. So who knows who is right or wrong.
My overall view is that runs scored are as good as runs saved. You assume the offense will stay the same in future years, but it might not. Even if what you assume is true, though, I still think the lack of SS options internally plays a big role. To the title of your post, I wholeheartedly believe in the theory of opportunity cost. I just happen to interpret SS as the place to take risks because I see the internal opportunity costs for SS as being minimal.
I think the internal options (Greene, Barden, Ryan, Solono???) don’t present much of an alternative for 2009, 2010, or maybe even 2011. I think we’d be more likely to get an OPS+ of 70 than 85 with what we have now – 85 is an arbitrary league avg. guess for a starting SS. It’s unfortunate, but I don’t think I am out of line assuming that. I think most teams have something, either in their big club or in the advanced minors, that is better than what we have. Just based off those 2 items, it probably makes more sense for us to pony up for a SS than it would almost anyone else.
You can get some marginal upgrades and keep them to a 1 year deal, as you mention. Maybe get something like an 80 OPS+ and some solid defense. Not a bad option, really. It’s safe in one sense because if you miss you can start over again. In another though, maybe it is not, because the likelihood is that you will have to play the same game again before 2010. Maybe a 3rd time in 2011.
Rather than try to go 2-2 or 3-3 on multiple short term deals, I’m more inclined to spend a little more, in dollars or prospects, and try to hit on one mid term solution that bridges you to Kozma or Vasquez (hopefully), and gives you a real chance to get an more significant upgrade on that 70 that I assume with Greene & Co. Even if Furcal slips to OPS+ of 95, 90, 80 in the next 3 years, I’d still think we are safely buying several wins over our internal options in the next 2 years and then having to pay the price for our sins (not developing a SS) in the 3rd. And if somebody unexpected emerges from the system, don’t worry, we still have 2B to fill.
I don’t feel the same doom and gloom with starting pitching. You always like depth, and I think we need to add some in 09’. I’d like to allow for the possibility that we can add depth internally in 10’ & 11’, though. Don’t feel there is any sense in counting on that with SS, or probably even 2B.
Anyway I will probably get slapped on the wrist for being wordy too, but I think it’s a pretty good discussion.
by Merry CRasmus on Aug 27, 2008 1:43 AM EDT up reply actions
my argument...
… is that you have the potential for both. if you are satisfied that you’ve got strong pitching depth, which would be difficult to do if you’re relying on Garcia/Boggs/Mort/Todd to fill adequately fill at least two, and potentially three, spots within the next two years, not including the strong chance that Carp, Welly, or Waino (or one of the prospects) gets injured during that stretch, then you’ve got no depth.
you could go the route that LB proposes: sign a couple of Livan Hernandezes or Josh Foggs to one or two year deals with a low outlay. but LB (and others) have routinely criticized the front office for making exactly those sorts of moves in the past (e.g. Ponson, Wells, Clement, etc.) because they don’t tend to add real depth of any quality. there’s no “upside” to those moves. those guys aren’t real replacements for the sort of steady production that you’d get from Lowe or Dempster.
but if you do add a Lowe or Dempster, then you have a real shift in the way the org can manage its resources. suddenly, a player like Mort can be dealt (with another piece or two probably) in order to build up the lack on depth at the MIF positions. and if not, well Izturis has a 68 OPS+ so far this year; if average is ~ 80 for SS, then he’s probably within one standard deviation. given the fact that he’s firmly above-average in runs prevented, he’s probably pretty close to being an average overall SS. a team like the Cards can absorb a position or two like that: slightly below average, but at little cost and no commitment.
I'll give this a quick run-through.
2 WAR is average, 0 is replacement level.
Zobrist probably shouldn’t be playing SS at the ML level, and his bat won’t carry the glove.
Izturis is replacement level. .230 EqA with average to slightly plus defense. That’s a AAA shortstop. IOW Brendan Ryan.
Lillibridge: No idea after his terrible year. According to PECOTA he was basically Rafael Furcal with room for a little growth coming into the season. Getting him for anything reasonable would be a really nice risk/reward move.
Colin Wyers makes this part very easy, but the projections are from last year:
http://home.comcast.net/~briankaat/statsite.html
Same with Tango’s salary scale:
http://www.tangotiger.net/salary2008.html
Otherwise, we could just weight wOBA and Dewan’s fielding numbers and do it by hand. I don’t have a problem with that, but waiting until the projection systems come out seems preferable.
MI:
Orlando Cabrera: 1.4 WAR
Rafael Furcal: 2 WAR
Ellis: 3.4 WAR
Everett: 2.1 WAR
Grudzielanek: 1.8 WAR
Hudson: 3.3 WAR
Miles: 0 WAR
Kennedy: 1 WAR
Ryan: 0.35 WAR
Izturis: 0.2 WAR
Tango’s methodology for the starters: http://www.insidethebook.com/ee/index.php/site/comments/how_to_calculate_war/
I just used 4.40 for the league, 1.9 as the exponent and BP’s peripheral ERA.
SP:
Lowe: 3 WAR
Sheets: 3 WAR
Sabathia: 5 WAR
Burnett: 4.75 WAR
Pineiro: 1.25 WAR
Wellemeyer: 1.8 WAR
Garcia: 1.65 WAR
Once again those numbers have to be taken with a large grain of salt since we are a year away from those projections. And as for the pitchers, it’s up to you what you think the chances are of those pitchers hitting 198 innings. Same for Carp and Wainwright for that matter when it comes to how much you think they are worth.
Couple of other points:
- You always want to backload contracts.
- Since pitchers are inherently risky, it’s probably built in to free agent contracts on average at least somewhat.
Anyway, like I said, that was basically a waste of time, but there are some jumping off points. Should be interesting this offseason with some better numbers though.
one last quibble...
… in a perfect world, this statement of yours is absolutely correct:
I point out the risks with pitchers, and I think they are present whether you deal with top of the rotation, 2nd tier, or bottom. I don’t advocate staying away from the market altogether, just advocate limiting yourself to a short term deal (1-2 years).
unfortunately, in the real world, limiting yourself to a short term (i.e. 1-2 year deals) does essentially keep you out of the market for most free agents of value. the exceptions are the geezers or the injury-rehabs who are trying to re-establish value. the Cards have scoured those markets thoroughly over the years, with mixed results. and not just pitchers; the Cards have picked up the likes of Womack, Sanders, Grudz, Belly, Eck, Iz2, and others under the same philosophy. but no impact player without some significant will be available on the same terms. that’s just not the state of the market.
maybe we could get Furcal for 1 year if we offered him $20mn (assuming he’s got other offers on the table which approach 4/$50 or so). but why do that when you could get him for three years for $38mn (assuming that is feasible) or 4/$50? you’d have to be convinced that he won’t be worth an average of $9-10mn/year in the last two-three years of the deal. but if he wouldn’t be, then the wisdom of giving him $20 for the first year is begging the question.
an exception would be if you have a can’t-miss SS prospect whose ETA is one year, but that’s not the position the Cards are in. their best SS prospect — Kozma — is still at least two years away, and he’s not projected to be so super anyway.
i see that you’ve just responded on this point specifically below, so i’ll move down there to keep things organized.
I think our differences amount to this...
…..I’m a little more optimistic about what pitchers you can get with a 1-2 year deal. I’m probably also more pessimistic about what happens when you give pitchers longterm deals, particularly at the end of the contract.
What you say about SS/Furcal I mostly agree with. Ideally he could be signed to a 2 year deal with an option for a 3rd, but that probably isn’t very practical. Probably have to give 3. It’s probably a winning deal for the Cards – moreso if the money can be frontloaded to some extent. I can also get behind trading from areas of strength and avoiding free agency to address SS – assuming those opportunities exist.
by Merry CRasmus on Aug 27, 2008 2:46 AM EDT up reply actions
the emancipation proclamation: less than 700 words.
this thread: more than 13,000
here’s to analysis! downs entire bottle of tullibardine scotch, passes out
"so if you can’t understand what someone else is saying why don’t you just shut up about it instead of being a jerk-off?"
wordiness is next to godliness
Tullibardine!
A new one on me. I had to consult my Malt Whisky Companion to learn something about Tullibardine.
by Youneverknow on Aug 25, 2008 5:52 PM EDT up reply actions
a liquor store here was going out of business, so i bought a bottle of 16-year and had some last night. had never heard of it before. anyway, i’m working on a 16,000-word review to post on viva el whisky later tonight.
"so if you can’t understand what someone else is saying why don’t you just shut up about it instead of being a jerk-off?"
wordiness is next to godliness
I think its about...
using big words to sound smart. Unfortunately, he also uses approximately 1 million prepositional phrases and several sentences that alone rival War and Peace.
I personally felt like I imbibed an amphora of scotch post deciphering this commerce laced thread imbecility. (“smart” person code for Got tipsy readin’ this stuff)
Its baseball people…keep it simple. It really isn’t this complicated!
by CrimsonBirdFan on Aug 25, 2008 7:03 PM EDT up reply actions
If you're drinking out of an
amphora, you should definitely be drinking ouzo!!
They say that it's never too late, but you don't get any younger...
you're right...
… scratch everything i wrote above. instead, i propose that the Cardinals just play better.
simple and short enough for ya? and not a single preposition. not sure which ‘big words’ you were referring to, tho. “opportunity”?
oh, maybe he's talking about...
incentivized
probabilistic performance calculation
probabilistic assumptions
i don’t know. i tried to look, but after a minute i had an epileptic seizure (mine are triggered by redundancies).
now if you’ll excuse me, i’m going to go make some nachos. i bought the tostitos brand, which required me to expend more resources in purchasing them than if i had elected to choose to acquire the crisps from a different (read: generic) purveyor. of course, a simple cost-benefit analysis will help determine whether that is a feasible plan for me to employ in future grocering endeavors, but to dismiss all leading brands of tortilla products on the basis of “opportunity cost” is at best socialistically misguided and at worst flagrantly – and unmagnanimously – bereft of scientific reasoning. even the layperson will tell you that. salsa, on the other hand, is characterized by a more wide-ranging and preference-dependent set of qualities and thus may be prone to decision-making processes that are less cognizant of manufacturer’s suggested retail price – in many cases rendering a consumer less spendthrifty – and more apt to expenditures that exceed a comparable product with an incommensurable ratio of cost-quality. perhaps one (such as myself) benefits as much from the purchase of an elite salsa if it also has benefits outside of the ceramic container it is placed in — newman’s own could be proffered as one example, especially as its profits are purportedly distributed to a charitable organization characterized by needs greater than the consumer’s own desires. now, cheese (the topic i have been avoiding thus far) is an entirely different animal, in that it actually does come from a bovine mammal and not a ground-typical plant such as the vine-based tomato or red (sometimes green) colored pepper, both of which may have multiplication-related effects on the cost absorbed by the manufacturing agent of the salsa/picante product. one factor (of many) to consider when exchanging monetary value for processed dairy production is whether or not the flavor-based description matches the ethnicity of the foodstuff you plan to orchestrate in the context of your own meal or intrameal consumption period. for this reason, for the time period consisting of the near future (pending amendment depending on evolving perspectives), i prefer to purchase tostitos mini tortilla chips, newman’s own hot salsa and borden or kraft shredded mexican cheese.
"so if you can’t understand what someone else is saying why don’t you just shut up about it instead of being a jerk-off?"
wordiness is next to godliness
good effort...
… i got a chuckle.
but if it’s so bothersome to you, then let me ask you: why in the hell do you keep coming back for more? as you’ve mentioned, this thread has got to be over 20,000 words at this point. if you’re not getting bang for your buck, then quit wasting your time. the use of your time involves opportunity costs too, you know. if you’d rather just bitch about the bullpen or TLR’s line-up decisions, there are at least two threads daily which provide plenty of opportunities for you.
as for those horribly big words you mentioned — like “probability,” “calculation,” “performance,” and “assumption” — i’d challenge you to offer me alternatives which would convey the same level of meaning without being even more wordy and verbose.
as i mentioned, these posts are done quickly and without a ton of care. but if the level of discourse or the necessary vocabulary is above your preferred level, that’s hardly my fault.
your own signature quote might be instructive here.
which quote?
the jerk-off thing? probably. the wordiness? oh, definitely!
why do i keep coming back? why does FJM keep going back to joechats? answer: because we have nothing better to do.
listen. years ago, i adopted a small, starving german street urchin named Brevity, and she changed my life. i began writing beautiful music with dylan-esque lyrics, constructing witty, biting letters to the editor of my local newspaper, delivering heart-fluttering love letters to the women of my dreams…
i became free.
i encourage you to free yourself, too! it’s wonderful down here, foundering on my level of discourse!
"so if you can’t understand what someone else is saying why don’t you just shut up about it instead of being a jerk-off?"
wordiness is next to godliness
and i forgot. i don’t know about “probabilistic performance calculation” (though i suspect it’s akin to a "prediction") but i do have an ironic sentence to translate.
i’d challenge you to offer me alternatives which would convey the same level of meaning without being even more wordy and verbose.
becomes
“can you say it in fewer words?”
"so if you can’t understand what someone else is saying why don’t you just shut up about it instead of being a jerk-off?"
wordiness is next to godliness
I think you're missing the point
i’d challenge you to offer me alternatives which would convey the same level of meaning without being even more wordy and verbose.
It wasn’t that he can’t understand the vocabulary or that the discourse is “above his preferred level.” It was that you’re using $5000 words and phrases when $5 will suffice. ..without sacrificing any meaning whatsoever.
“incentivized” = $5000
“probabilistic assumptions” = $10,000
“probabilistic performance calculation” = however much it costs Jim Edmonds to frost his hair (in Canadian dollars)
i'll respond here to the three posts above...
… “probabilistic performance calculation” doesn’t mean the same thing as “prediction”. it has a greater depth, and implies deeper analysis. an example of the difference: every year the VEB community predicts the performance of key players, basically by trusting our collective gut. in fact, LB usually asks us NOT to inform our opinion too much before making our choices. at the same time, BP issues predictions by running their prediction models at different levels of probability. so they’ve got a prediction at the 50th percentile, the 75th percentile, etc. the former is what you’re talking about when you say “prediction”. the latter is what i was hoping to bring to mind. since i used those phrases in a specific statistical context — a discussion of variance — i was referencing the BP-type of analysis; not the trust-your-gut-and-take-a-guess type. so they don’t mean the same thing at all.
in my challenge, the key phrase was “which would convey the same level of meaning”. your retorts don’t do that. in any case, “brevity” means fewer words, not smaller ones. perhaps i’m guilty of running on too much. i’ll cop to it. but this thread has also covered a LOT of ground, from the general to the specific.
but i’m kind of surprised by this criticism. basically every word you’ve criticized is a word used in statistics. given how stat-heavy this site can be at times, and what little brevity it often has, i wouldn’t expect the use of words like “probability” or “assumption” — even used in tandem (oops, is “tandem” a $50 million dollar word too?) — to be troublesome for regular readers.
but i’m forced to use all these words (and much bigger, more oblique ones as well!) every day, and so does everyone else around me. i don’t just break them out on special occasions. so maybe i’m just in the habit, and can’t see how weird it is.
maybe it’s the suffixes that are the problem. “incentive” doesn’t seem like a big word. neither does “probability”. but you guys don’t like “incentivized” or “probabilistic”.
or maybe it’s the combinations. “assumption” doesn’t seem like a problem for people. but “probabilistic assumption” makes eyes roll. but they don’t mean the same thing. i guess i could have said “the chance that an assumption is correct”; that’s shorter, but wordier. i really don’t know what the monetary value of a given word is, but i meant what i wrote. i used those words on purpose because they mean things that other words do not. it wasn’t an accident, and it wasn’t vocab masturbation.
anyway, the point of this thread was to appeal to people to use scientific terms and concepts properly if they were to use them at all. and then i get criticized for using scientific terms and concepts. i guess it serves me right.
obviously
the problem is that you (and everyone else around you) is just a whole lot smarter than us common folk. we cain’t follow all them fancy sayins!
vocab masturbation? au contraire. this thread has been, at times, a raunchy display of furious debate-club circle-jerking (the participants huddled around a belabored point that no one disputed in the first place), recorded on a 90-minute mini-DV tape and then posted over and over and over again on xtube.com.
for the love of all that is succint and tersely written, i can’t watch you beat this gopher into the hole anymore. the game is over. the nerf bat is tattered, the rent-a-cop security guard is on his radio and children nearby are crying because the machine is broken.
btw, you didn’t respond to my translation of that sentence. would it still compute in the scientific community?
"so if you can’t understand what someone else is saying why don’t you just shut up about it instead of being a jerk-off?"
"i’d challenge you to offer me alternatives which would convey the same level of meaning without being even more wordy and verbose."
if this thread is porn...
… i’d rather be a participant than a voyeur.
i did specifically address your “translation” in the post directly above yours. see the paragraph discussing the phrase “which would convey the same level of meaning”. your “translation” didn’t do that. wordiness may not actually be next to godliness, but neither is brevity at the cost of meaning. (in any case, you never answered my challenge: gimme shorter versions of the offending words — “probability,” “assumption,” “performance,” “incentive,” & “calculation” — that don’t lose meaning, and i’ll be happy to adopt them.)
would your “translation” compute in the “scientific community”? in spite of the sarcasm, i’ll answer seriously: no. at least not the spirit of it. the “scientific community” cares very much about probabilities, net present values, levels of risk and risk-aversion, portfolio balance, consumption smoothing, performance variance, and other such pornographic topics. the sources that this site routinely cites — BP, HT, fangraphs, BR, Bill James, tango, etc. — all care about these topics very much as well, as does the Cardinals front office (presumably). the “scientific community” tends to care much less about brevity than precision.
bottom line: neither i nor anyone else have to restrict my writing style, subject matter, or vocabulary in order in order to suit your specific goddamn tastes. that’s not in the community guidelines, nor in the tradition of the blog. the rules of discourse aren’t set by Plaschke or you (and its funny that you brought up FJM earlier, since the last thing i am is more high-winded, pompous, or tedious in defense of statistical principles as some of their analyses). as i’ve mentioned, every single day you’ve got two main threads and a fanpost — in addition to every other Cardinals-related blog or message board in the world — to talk about Lopez vs. Miles in the line-up. those threads each spawn 300+ comments, so there’s evidently plenty to discuss in short form. but it is my prerogative to start one fanpost a year dealing with statistical concepts. i think you ought to be able to handle that, or at least ignore it. everyone else can. to each his own, and this post got recs and a ton of discussion.
in any case, i’m done with you in this thread. be constructive or leave me alone.
ah, yes.
bill james, tom tango, will carroll… and the ever-precise kindred winecoff. comrades-in-arms in the scientific community.
sorry for challenging your vast intellectual authority, man. clearly you’ll never need an editor. it must be exhausting, communicating with us philistines.
"so if you can’t understand what someone else is saying why don’t you just shut up about it instead of being a jerk-off?"
"i’d challenge you to offer me alternatives which would convey the same level of meaning without being even more wordy and verbose."
I perfectly understand what you wrote...
but thats only because I’m educated and can decipher the wordiness. I was just trying to get across the point that your post would have been much more effective if you got to the point faster than Yadi runs to 1st base.
I made the same point in 175 words as you did in 870 words. And I’d say my post was more effective, because it didn’t automatically garner comments about the 100 degree marathon-like exhaustion after reading it.
by CrimsonBirdFan on Aug 28, 2008 10:28 PM EDT up reply actions
i see your point...
… i’m sorry if it was to wordy for some.
i was trying to move beyond the points you were making. while true enough, there’s a lot more to do the discussion than just “don’t sign mediocrity if you’ve already got it”. i was trying to get to a point where we could look more objectively at the pluses and minuses of personnel decisions. that takes time and explication. we do some of that on this board in the off-season when we compare marginal wins, as well as what the going rate is for that production. it used to be something like $2.5mn per marginal win; not sure if that’s still true or not. anyway, that’s the point i was hoping to get to, as well as correcting what i see as a common misunderstanding of opportunity costs and their application. and in that regard, your first post and mine aren’t really very close to each other at all. you may be right on another point, tho: your post might be more effective.
what i took offense to in your second post should be obvious. it wasn’t the “imbecility” crack, which doesn’t bother me that much. i took offense to the idea that you thought i was show-boating. i wasn’t trying to. i don’t come to VEB for intellectual validation, for Christ’s sake. i’ve got better avenues for that if i need it. i come here for high-level discussion. if my posts aren’t worth peoples’ time, then they won’t be read, and i’ll stop posting them. that wasn’t the case here. that’s why i responded the way i did to you, and why i kept going back at baw.
anyway, no hard feelings to you. i know you’ve been around here for a long time, and the last thing i wanted was to get into a pissing match with anyone.
hmmm...
I’m not going to read all of this, but I think giving any non-ace pitcher a 4 year contract is complete insanity. Basically, if your not going to dole out large sums for mediocre pitchers, this means you’ll be shopping the junk heap or trying to give the young guys a shot. We got lucky this year with Lohse, but last year’s Kyle Lohse was Kip Wells (basically the same money). I think it’s a relatively dangerous way to construct a rotation – see pineiro. I’d rather have an $8-11 Million dollar middle IF thats going to produce everyday, than a 8-11 million dollar starting pitcher that is going to post below league average results like a Kevin Millwood, Gil Meche, Carlos Silva, Jarrod Washburn, Miguel Batista, etc. I think there’s enough talent in the organization that we shouldn’t have to do that. It’s bad enough we have one more year of Joel.
By the way – Remember when we were in pursuit of Jason Schmidt and Mike Hampton? Phew!!
Nick Stavinoah = John Gall
by The Ghost of Todd Burns on Aug 27, 2008 5:13 AM EDT reply actions
we mostly covered all that...
… to summarize: in general, i’d rather give $8-11mn to a good MIF than to a mediocre pitcher as well. but in the real world, we have more options to improve the team at pitcher than at MIF. so if you set a hard-and-fast rule — “no pitchers get multi-year deals unless they are an ace” — then you basically have to sign Furcal. you don’t really have any other way to improve the team. and if/when that doesn’t pan out, you’re basically stuck with your hands in your pocket. if you can get an above-average pitcher (e.g. Lowe, Dempster) even if he isn’t an ace, then you have an ability to trade from your surplus of pitching (and OF, in this case) to either build up the weak areas in your farm system or acquire an MLB-ready MIF.
basically, loosening up the rules gives you more options besides “sign Furcal or we’re dicked”.
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