Building A Bullpen - Part IV
by azruavatar on Dec 28, 2007 2:49 AM EST
in St. Louis Cardinals News
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PrintThe save is a statistic that has been disproved as far as any real predictive value or even descriptive value. The way closers are utilized primarily in the 9th inning is often a misrepresentation of when the leveraging index research would tell managers to use closers (i.e. their best reliever). I have my differences with the leveraging and win expectancy but we've all watched as managers have let a middle reliever face the heart of an opponents batting order in the 8th inning and then the closer to face lesser hitters in the 9th. There's an intuitive aspect to that that just doesn't seem to make sense.
Tony LaRussa obviously ascribes to that school of thought, which considers the mentality required for the 9th inning significantly different from the 8th inning and thus requiring a unique reliever. This isn't an unusual train of thought nor one that I'm particularly inclined to berate LaRussa for. I don't like it but the insular nature of baseball makes it hard for new ideas to really penetrate the business at times. At least we haven't been subjected to (very many) seasons like Joe Borowski for the Tribe in '07 or Todd Jones for the Tigers in '06. Knowing that players like Rafeal Betancourt and Joel Zumaya were pretty clearly the superior pitchers in those seasons compared to their closing counterparts is frustrating.
That was the case for the Cardinals in 2006 as we all watched (and often cursed) the blown saves from Isringhausen. It's safe to say that very few, if any, of us realized the real extent that his hip was prohibiting him from pitching. That season Adam Wainwright, who had been put in the pen in a misguided effort to wring value from Sidney Ponson, put together a fine collection of relief appearances before turning truly dominant in the postseason. Watching Isringhausen's dramatic improvement in 2007 makes for a slightly different situation to the Tigers and Indians who simply put inferior pitchers in as "closers".
| Player | Year | K/BB | FIP | WPA | gmLI |
| Borowski | 2007 | 3.41 | 4.08 | 1.36 | 1.96 |
| Betancourt | 2007 | 8.89 | 2.18 | 5.38 | 1.79 |
| Jones | 2006 | 2.55 | 3.79 | 1.00 | 1.74 |
| Zumaya | 2006 | 2.21 | 3.39 | 3.65 | 1.58 |
| Isringhausen | 2006 | 1.37 | 5.75 | -0.82 | 1.98 |
| Wainwright | 2006 | 3.27 | 3.36 | 1.70 | 1.06 |
The Tigers situation in 2006 was closer that I would have guessed looking at peripherals. Zumaya has a pretty sizable advantage when considering WPA and WPA per plate appearance. Plus, just ask yourself who you'd rather have finishing games in 2006: Joel Zumaya or Todd Jones? Without scrutinizing the numbers any closer, my gut reaction says Zumaya was the better pitcher. The difference between Borowski and Betancourt, however, is so extreme that it makes one wonder what Eric Wedge was thinking. You can read about WPA and gmLI at Fangraphs -- the short version is that WPA is a counting stat for wins added where a win equals .5 and gmLI is the average leverage index for a reliever when they entered the game.
In any case, the idea of the closer being confined to the 9th inning seems flawed and the notion of saves as a worthwhile statistic seems a bit archaic. I certainly don't want to pick a pitcher based on their year to year saves. A quick look at the saves leaders from 1987-2007 shows 130 different players who recorded 20 or more saves in a season. Of those 130, only 35 managed to have at least three consecutive years of 30+ saves and only 20 had at least 4 consecutive years of 30+ saves.
Continuing down the road of saves led me to look at the career leaders list. That makes me wonder if there isn't some nugget of truth to be found in the save statistic -- count something for long enough and it starts to look important! I thought it would be interesting to look at the active leaders left (Trevor Hoffman - 1st, Mariano Riveira - 3rd and Billy Wagner - 7th) as well as our own incumbent closer who ranks 24th all time. I rifled through some numbers and thought that this graph was pretty interesting.
Each players K/BB is plotted versus their age through 2006 in seasons where they accumulated saves. While Isringhausen doesn't look all that special compared to the greats, there's some pretty wild relief seasons in there. They weren't necessarily the years where the reliever had the most saves but the peripherals are outstanding. There's some rounding in the table, which is why it doesn't exactly match the graph.
| Name | year | BB/9 | K/9 | FIP |
| Trevor Hoffman | 2000 | 1.4 | 10.6 | 2.56 |
| Trevor Hoffman | 2004 | 1.3 | 8.7 | 2.89 |
| Mariano Rivera | 2001 | 1.3 | 9.3 | 2.43 |
| Mariano Rivera | 2003 | 1.3 | 8.0 | 2.56 |
| Billy Wagner | 2004 | 1.1 | 11.0 | 2.60 |
Following this to it's logical conclusion, if a reliever is truly a top echelon performer, than chances are at some point they'll get a chance to close games and garner some saves. If they have continued success, they'll probably be given every opportunity to retain their "closer" title even past the point of being the best reliever on their team. Those pitchers who have climbed up the leader board in career saves combine being the best reliever with having a chance at getting those saves. They probably have been the best relievers in terms of reliability and performance over an extended time period.
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Tony inventend the closer
IMHO, the perfect setup guy is someone that have a very high strand percentage, so that he can pitch any moment based on need, while the closer is someone that give opponents a very low OBP, but which capacity to strand runners is not so high and that can last only 1 inning.
GO CARDS!!!
Those are not that different.
As to "strand %" I suspect K/9 is more important than bb/9.
In my mind what this all says is you want the wilder pitcher with a great K rate available for bailout duty. He give you a good chance of getting out of a jam at the expense of blowing up every once in a while when the control eludes him.
On the closer front you want someone that really doesn't make their own messes. You look at the list of leaders and for the most part they all have average to great walk rates. Or put another way, they all tend to be pitchers that make the other team beat them rather than handing out gifts.
This is what maze 2006 Izzy so painful to watch. You never knew how many extra base runners he was just going to give out.
Ok for the closer...
But for the setup man, I was thinking more of someone that can make hitters swing at bad pitches, inducing popup or weak grounders, so that the chances of scoring are minimal. Ok if he is a little wild, what is important is that he could escape with minimal o no damage.
GO CARDS!!!
Then you don't want
The basic elements of DIPS predict strand rate, it itself is not really a skill. It's just the inverse of score rate, so this makes sense.
Eckersley
- 3 BB, 55 K
- 4 BB, 73 K
Thats just crazy. Thats also how you get a 1.56 and 0.61 ERA in back to back seasons. Give them nothing and strike out as many as you can.
wow..
Makes you wonder what the graph might look like when plotting the top active closers and Isringhausen's K/BB as they faced "heart of the order" 9th innings (along with fewer 8th inning tough outs thrown in).
Which part of the order you face in the 9th has to average out some if you get 40+ save opportunities over the course of the season.
Hoffmans lifetime HBP rate vs. Riveras (as well as Wagner and Izzy) surprises me, but based on approach and style, it should'nt. Nine full seasons without hitting a batter! Big difference considering how close his and Riveras lifetime IPs are.
Take away Izzys BBs during years as a starter and the numbers start to get tighter.
Wedge
Similar situation with Leyland in 2006
uhhhh?
by bigcardsfan5 on Dec 28, 2007 8:36 AM EST up reply actions
firemen of yore
The 9th inning "closer"
If Izzy (or some other closer) pitches more games where more than 1 inning is needed, he may be unavailable for other save situations so managers need to be willing to use other relievers when they're up 3 runs in the 9th. Springer or Franklin or most anyone else can be used to close out a 5-2 game so that Izzy can be used in more high-leverage situations.
How about closers by committee?
I tend to disagree a bit and think that there is definitely something unique about the closer. Again, I do not have stats or even annecdotes that come immediately to mind... But I have the impression that, over the year, many have tried the closer by committee concept, probably out of necessity most of the time, and I don't recal that philosophy ever being successful. If what I say is true, would that be some evidence for the uniqueness of closers?
I would disagree that AZ
If the game may be won or lost in the 7th or 8th -- that's when the "ace reliever" should pitch. You could (and should, BTW) change the definition of a "save" to indicate a saving performance by a pitcher during the highest leveraged situation -- when the most is on the line.
This would turn the 9th inning over to different relievers from time to time, but there would be a consistent application of the "ace reliever" during the time in the game in which he was most needed. Very often, that's the 9th inning but sometimes it's not. And very often, in fact, it's at some point in the 8th when there are runners on base and the manager trots out some inferior reliever so that he can save the "closer" for the 9th when the game can and likely will be "saved" right then.
How about non-save situations
But aren't those two things somewhat related? It just seems like things don't go too well when there is not a guy designated/anointed as the closer for the 9th. I know that many times a closer is used to get the last out in the eighth inning and then the ninth or even stretched to cover 8th and 9th. But the use of the closer as a situational pitcher means that he is not available to close out the game. Which might mean a closer by committee?
How about the weird phenomenon of closers not doing well in non-save situations? Again I don't know if this is true statistically, but one hypothesis is that closers are wired for that 9th inning finishing job. Just thinking out aloud. Maybe I am totally off track.
I think the issue of how a "save" is defined is a totally separate issue. And I agree that the definition might not be a very good one to say it mildly.
No doubt they are wired for the save
On economists and saberticians
Similarly saberticians look at statistics and ignore behavioral and psycological preferences. That being siad, I recall many relief pitchers stating they could do their job easier if they knew what was expected of them and when. It seems there is likely some kind of psycological edge in a guy knowing he is a closer or a set up or a loogy.
Bottom of the 9th, 1 out
The ball is still round.
The plate is still the same distance away.
The mound is still the same height.
Yet, there is certainly the effect of psychological pressure that can't really be measured through a simple overlooking of statistics. Anyone who has been in a pressure packed situation: driving in snow, running from a burning house, trying to make free-throws with no time left and the game on the line, etc. knows that performing even simple acts become more difficult due to the bodies natural reaction to situations it is not accustom to.
by Hardcore Legend on Dec 28, 2007 2:28 PM EST up reply actions
But there are plenty of counterexamples
I was saying that there WAS
by Hardcore Legend on Dec 28, 2007 2:46 PM EST up reply actions
There are plenty of examples
Neither AZ nor anyone else, myself included, has intimated that this is a job that anyone can do. People who have taken issue w/ AZ on this seem to be suggesting (and I'm not saying you're one, HL) that there is a bimodal way of using your bullpen -- 1 w/ traditional roles (7th inning for 1 guy, 8th for another, 9th for your closer) and 1 where the manager calls on any reliever at any time -- where there are no roles. I don't think anyone has argued for that.
Still, it's not too far-fetched to say that most every bullpen has its best pitcher, whether it be Izzy in the Cards' or Betancourt in the Indians'. It goes w/o saying that this person should be the "closer" -- the 9th inning guy. It should be pointed out that Betancourt, a better reliever than Borowski, has never gotten a shot at the 9th. Might he fail in that role? Possibly, but he's been very successful in high-leverage situations in the past. He's not Mike Timlin -- who performs well w/ nothing on the line and badly w/ something on the line.
Are there better ways to use the "closer?" Before you answer, consider how the "closer" is used in the postseason by managers. Do winning managers sit on the closer until the 9th or do they often call upon him in the 8th, sometimes to begin the inning, if the team needs the win? Yes, there are days off in the postseason but why is it necessary to use your closer to close a 6-3 game? Can't your 2nd best guy do that if your closer needs a day off?
The point is to use your best guy in the highest leveraged situations. Since that's not realistically going to happen (b/c of save rules and relievers liking to know their roles), can't the closer's "role" be to pitch the 9th and sometimes the 8th when we need you? The loogy still would be used to get lefties out. The 7th and 8th inning guys would still be used to get the game to the closer, but there's no need to "save" the closer for the 9th when the game might be lost in the 8th. That can be part of his understood role.
The psychological thing of which many have written can be measured, statistically, by the way in which they perform in high leverage situations, such as the 9th. Hawkins, Timlin, and Farnsworth have historically not performed well in high-leverage situations, indicating that there is something psychological about the role of a closer. But once we establish who the closer is, can't we use him for more than 1 inning at times? Do we need to use him to begin the 9th, up 3, w/ the bottom 3rd of the lineup due up? And can't the guy w/ the better tools and the better peripherals who has also performed well in high-leverage situations be considered over the guy who's gotten lots of those 6-3 "saves" but who's also blown lots of saves b/c their tools and their peripherals aren't as good?
I remember...
and "Retard" is the Nickname I gave him last year lol...
Zubin, you are my hero!
I believe that Hawkins later moved back to the set-up position and became a great releiver again. In 2001, he was made Minnesota's closer, and posted a nifty 5.96 era. The next year, he was removed from that role, and posted a 2.13.
In Dotel's case, he was horrible as a closer, saving only 82 of 114 chances in part-time closer duty. However, he posteds some premier set-up numbers.
It remains to be seen what Brad Lidge will be able to do with himself. I hope he rights the ship. I really do enjoy watching his slider absolutely devastate hitters.
Clearly, there has to be something to closing other than great K/BB ratios. It goes back to the old nature-versus-nuture debate. I believe that a combination of good "stuff" and mentality are generally successful. Eckersly succeeded as a closer even after his pitching arm deteriorated simply because he would NOT beat himself. On the other hand, Gagne lived on 2 great pitches and when they failed, he lacked the ability to get hitters out with his lesser abilities.
I believe some of these young closers survive on 1 or 2 superior pitches and a whole lotta "balls". They come up believing they are unbeatable, and have to be shown different. Sometimes they are proved human (Lidge). Sometimes they lose a little bite on a breaking pitch or a few mph on a fastball (Gagne). Sometimes they actually succeed and become productive closers for a long time (Rivera, Nathan). A whole lotta people can save games. Not very many of them can blow a save and trot right back out there the next game to do it again.
Nobody's missing
And really, whatever makes a player get hits will show up in the hit column. Most practical acknowledgments of this would be double counting anyway.
There's no big revelation here.
Jesus, looks
Don't statistics
Nevertheless, his other stats (and his tools, BTW) indicated that he was a person who should have been tried in the role of a closer. You can't find out whether or not one can handle a role unless he's been tried there.
You are most certainly right.
The point I guess some of us are trying to make is that we shouldn't be so confused when a guy with stellar stuff can't figure out how to end a game effectively. Some of us just ain't finishers.
As far as your dataset goes, I suppose we could seperate all of LaTroy's apperances by save opportunities versus non-save opportunities. If his stats are great in non-save opportunities, and deplorable in save chances, it is very fair to assume there is some sort of psychological block. Other things to control for may include a temporary loss of velocity or a flattened breaking pitch. We can only do that by looking at actual game footage.
We have had an effective closer for so long, I think we have forgotten how bad it can be when a team has to do that painful process of searching for one that is effective. I remember Atlanta a couple of years ago trying several people in the closer role to no avail (Reitsma, etc...). If I recall, it cost them a chance at another division title. Then they went out and gave some decent trade fodder for Bob freakin' Wickman.
Psych vs. Saber
Sorry about babbling like an idiot, but the short of it is that psych vs. saber is a false dichotomy.
Behavioral and psychological preferences
While I generally agree that a team could squeeze more value out of its closer, by using him earlier in high-leverage situations, I think psychological or behavior impact of this kind of utilization may offset some of those gains. For example in the Cardinals' case, I don't doubt that Izzy was not used often enough before the ninth inning. However, I also believe it is likely that he excelled in his closer role because he knew in a very tangible way when and how he'd be put into a game. Admittedly this is a nuanced view and surely I didn't make myself clear before. Apologies for that.
No apology needed
closer vs fireman
Nobody here seems to have mentioned
by MikeG on Dec 28, 2007 6:32 PM EST reply actions
..yep...
by cardschinmusic on Dec 29, 2007 6:35 AM EST up reply actions
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